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INTRODUCTION
Few lawsuits better capture our divided times than the Patagonia
clothing company's suit against President Donald Trump over
Trump's reduction of the Bears Ears National Monument in Utah.,
Patagonia seems to be the paradigm of a socially responsible
corporation; its founder practically invented corporate activism. 2
President Trump is, from the perspective of his opponents, an
editorial cartoon of a Gilded Age crony capitalist come to life. 3 The
landscape involved in Patagonia's suit against Trump is fitting for a
fight between good and evil: It is the red-rock canyons and wind-blown
buttes of southeast Utah, an area that has been the setting for many
cowboy westerns.4 And the underlying legal dispute is timeless: a fight

1. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Utah Din6 Bik6yah v.
Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02605-TSC (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter UDB Compl.]. See
generally Josh Dawsey & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Shrinks Two Huge National
Monuments in Utah, Drawing Praise and Protests, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-scales-back-two-huge-national-monu
ments-in-utah-drawing-praise-and-protests/2017/12/04/758c85c6-d908-11e7-bla8-62
589434a581_story.html?utm term=.576b908d40bl.
2. David Gelles, Patagonia v. Trump, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2018, at BU 1
(reporting that Patagonia "bills itself 'the Activist Company,"' and that Patagonia has
been unapologetically political since the 1970s"); id. (tracing Patagonia's activism to
1972, when founder Yvon Chouinard put company's support behind move to block
development on Ventura River). See generallyYVON CHOUINARD & VINCENT STANLEY,
THE RESPONSIBLE COMPANY: WHAT WE'VE LEARNED FROM PATAGONIA'S FIRST 40
YEARS (2d ed. 2016) (Patagonia founder and long-time Patagonia employee discuss
elements of corporate responsibility and how Patagonia has implemented those
elements).
3. See, e.g., Victoria Martinez, Editorial, Trump: A PecuniaryBarbarianin a
New
Gilded
Age,
ACTIVIST
HIST.
REV.
(Sept.
8,
2017),
https://activisthistory.com/2017/09/08/trump-a-pecuniary-barbarian-in-a-new-gildedage/; Rosecrans Baldwin, Patagonia vs. Donald Trump, GQ (Apr. 5, 2018),
https//www.gq.com/story/patagonia-versus-donald-trump (quoting Patagonia founder
Yvon Chouinard as stating that Trump administration "is purposely not doing
anything about climate [change] for the sake of making more money").
4. Moab to Monument Valley Film Commission, Films Made in the Area,
MOAB, http://discovermoab.com/movie-sites/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
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over land-specifically, the 1.1 million acres of public lands that
Trump slashed from Bears Ears' original boundaries. 5
This Article analyzes whether Patagonia has a dog in this fighti.e., whether it has standing for its federal-court suit against Trump.
Patagonia asserts that it has standing because Trump's action injures
6
the company as well as its employees and the athletes it sponsors.
Patagonia is thus suing both on its own behalf and in a representative
capacity. In suing for itself, Patagonia asserts what is often called
"organizational standing." In suing in a representative capacity,
Patagonia asserts "third-party" standing and "associational"
standing. Patagonia thus draws upon three lines of standing doctrine.
Patagonia's arguments for standing urge a bold extension of
existing law. Patagonia's argument for organizationalstanding is bold
because for-profit corporations like Patagonia usually sue the
government for over-protecting the environment and, in the process,
hurting the corporation's bottom line.7 In contrast, Patagonia argues
that Trump's reduction of Bears Ears under-protects the environment
and, in the process, hurts Patagonia's environmental advocacy
efforts.8 Patagonia's bid for third-party standing is bold because
Patagonia does not claim that the injury to the third parties it seeks
to represent-namely, its employees and sponsored athletes-impairs
its relationship with those third parties, as is typically required for
third-party standing. Patagonia's argument for associational
standing is bold because, in most lawsuits claiming that the
government is. under-protecting the environment, the plaintiffassociation is a nonprofit group like the Natural Resources Defense
Council suing for its members, not a for-profit corporation like
Patagonia suing for its work force. 9 Because Patagonia's standing

See UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 2.
5.
See UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 19.
6.
See generally Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
7.
8. See UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 19; Alexander C. Kaufman, Patagonia's
CEO Is Ready to Lead the CorporateResistance to Donald Trump, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 18, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/patagonia-public-lands-us
59440a8ee4bOleab7a2d5leO.
9. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339, 351 (1990) ("The vast
majority of private enforcement actions" under citizen-suit provisions of
environmental statutes "has been brought by environmental advocacy groups such as
the Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC)."); Jan G. Laitos, Standing and
Environmental Harm: The Double Paradox, 31 VA. ENVT'L L.J. 55, 56-57 (2013)
(stating that a common element of judicial challenges to government actions that
"seem to adversely affect the natural environment" is that "the suit is brought by a
non-profit non-governmental organization whose members are angered or saddened
about a threat to an environmental resource").
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arguments are bold, they depend for their success on the court's
taking a liberal view toward standing.
There is caselaw from the 1960s and 1970s supporting a more
liberal view of standing than exists today. 10 Although the Court began
restricting standing by the end of the 1970s, it has never revisited the
key cases from the more liberal era on which Patagonia's standing
arguments partly rely.1 1 Patagonia's lawsuit against Trump might be
a good vehicle for the Court to revisit those cases, because the suit
pushes those cases up to-and, this Article will argue, over-the
constitutional brink. This constitutional brink is the separation of
powers principle that underlies Article III's standing requirements. 12
This Article argues that Patagonia does not meet Article III's
standing requirements
under current
caselaw.
Patagonia's
organizational-standing argument fails because it mistakenly treats
setbacks to an organization's social-justice agenda as cognizable
injury. 13 Patagonia's lack of a cognizable injury, among other
deficiencies, also defeats its argument for third-party standing
argument.1 4 Patagonia's associational-standing argument founders
on the fact that Patagonia is not a membership association or
anything like it.15 In sum, Patagonia lacks any viable basis under
current law for standing to sue Trump for reducing Bears Ears. 6
That conclusion is only one of this Article's theses. In analyzing
Patagonia's standing, this Article develops two courses of action for
the Court. The Article argues, first, that the Court should clarify the

10.

See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 3531.1, at 53 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] ("From 1968 into the
early years of the 1970s, the cases ... culminated in what was seen to be a very
permissive approach to standing.... From the late years of the 1970s on, a more
demanding approach has been taken in many areas, but by no means all.").
11.
See id. ("No single approach [to standing] has become finally dormant; none
has gone to eternal rest.").
12. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("[The law of Art. III
standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers.").
13.
See infra Section II.C.
14. See infra Part IV.
15.
See infra Section V.C.
16.
There has been scant commentary on Patagonia's standing to sue Trump
over Bears Ears' reduction, and no academic writing as far as this author knows. See
Kaufman, supra note 8 (quoting Professor Mark Squillace as stating that "[t]he test
for standing is not too draconian, so I think most courts would let Patagonia in"); cf.
Warren Henry, No, Patagonia, President Trump Is Not 'Stealing Our Land',
FEDERALIST
(Dec.
6,
2017),
http://thefederaist.com/2017/12/06/no-patagoniapresident-trump-not-stealing-land/ ("Patagonia's assertion of standing arguably rests
on whether the marginal disincentive of people to buy its wares caused by Trump's
decision is so minimal as to not constitute a concrete injury in fact, where the
monument remains in a smaller form.").
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leading case on which Patagonia will rely for organizational standing:
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.'7 Contrary to some lower courts'
understanding, Havens does not apply in lawsuits to vindicate public
rights, such as Patagonia's.1 8 In addition, the Article argues that the
Court should revisit and repudiate the current test on which
Patagonia relies for associational standing, a test that comes from
19
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission. The Hunt
test for associational standing is indefensible on precedential and
constitutional grounds. 20
These points are elaborated in the next six parts of this Article.
Part I describes Patagonia's lawsuit against President Trump. Part II
analyzes Patagonia's assertion of organizational standing under
current law. Part III argues that the Court must clarify that Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, a leading case on organizational standing,
does not apply to suits like Patagonia's. Part IV analyzes Patagonia's
assertion of third-party standing under current law. Part V analyzes
Patagonia's assertion of associational standing under current law.
Part VI argues that the Court should revisit and revise the Hunt test
for associational standing.
I. BACKGROUND OF PATAGONIA V. TRUMP
A. The Creationand Reduction of the Bears Ears National
Monument
In December 2016, a few weeks before leaving office, President
Barack Obama issued a proclamation establishing the Bears Ears
National Monument. 2 1 The monument covered about 1.35 million
22
acres of federally owned land in southeast Utah. Bears Ears' name
came from the one that local Native American tribes had given to twin
buttes in the monument. 23 Obama created Bears Ears under the
Antiquities Act of 1906, a statute that authorizes the president to

17. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
18. See infra Part III.
19. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
See infra Part VI.
20.
Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (Dec. 28, 2016).
21.
22.
Ryan K. Zinke, Secretary of the Interior, Memorandum to the President,
Interim Report Pursuant to Executive Order 13792, at 4 (June 10, 2017),
Zinke
[hereinafter
https://digitallibrary.utah.gov/awweb/awarchive?item=85969
Interim Report].
23.
Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. at 1139.
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designate national monuments on existing public lands and to
"reserve parcels of land as a part of the national monuments." 24
Bears Ears' creation by Obama was a big win for some and a big
loss for others. And Bears Ears' reduction by Trump was a
monumental reversal of fortunes.
Bears Ears' creation was a big win for three main groups. It was
a big win for environmentalists. 25 That is because when public land
becomes a monument, the permissible uses of the land for things like
logging and mining become severely restricted. 26 Bears Ears' creation
was also a big win for scientists, because some land in the monument
(there is a dispute about how much) has objects of archeological and
paleontological significance. 27 Bears Ears' creation was, perhaps most
of all, a big win for the Native American tribes who had pushed for

24.
54 U.S.C. § 320301(a)-(b) (2012 & Supp. IV 2017).
25.
See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, Obama's Environmental Legacy, in Two Buttes,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/12/
obamas-environmental-legacy-in-two-buttes/511889/
("For
the
coalition
of
environmentalists and Native leaders who had long sought protection for the land,
[creation of Bears Ears] was a momentous victory.").
26.
Before the designation of Bears Ears, much of the federally owned land that
fell within its original boundaries was administered under principles of "multiple use"
and "sustained yield," which permitted some extractive uses on some land. These
principles applied to the monument land administered by the Department of Interior's
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) under the Federal Land and Policy Management
Act (FLPMA). 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(c), 1712(c)(1) (2012). The principles of multiple use
and sustained yield applied to land within the monument administered by the
Department of Agriculture's Forest Service (FS) under the Multiple-Use SustainedYield Act of 1960, which, as its name suggests, requires the FS to develop and
administer the "renewable surface resources of the national forests for multiple use
and sustained yield." 16 U.S.C. § 529 (2012). The multiple-use and sustained-yield
principles no longer necessarily apply when a monument is created. For example, the
proclamation establishing Bears Ears directs BLM and the FS to manage the land to
implement the purposes of the proclamation, which are to "protect[] and restor[e]" the
objects declared to be antiquities. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. at 1143-44.
That direction can cause uses of the monument land to be restricted to serve "the
overriding management goal" of protection. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41330,
NATIONAL
MONUMENTS
AND
THE
ANTIQUITIES
ACT
7-8
(2017),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170130_R41330_e313e8a36511852dca4acb36
87edf27c4ef3aab0.pdf.
27.
See Darryl Fears & Juliet Eilperin, Spectacular Fossils Found at Bears
Ears-Right Where Trump Removed Protections, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.comnews/speaking-of-science/wp/2018/02/22/spectacula
r-fossils-found-at-bears-ears-right-where-trump-removed-protections/.utm term=.49
acOdl3d5da. But see Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081, 58,082 (Dec. 8, 2017)
(Trump proclamation modifying Bears Ears partly based on disagreement about
location and significance of archeological and paleontological objects).
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protection of the area and were to be represented on an advisory
commission for the monument. 28
The biggest losers were Utah officials and Utahns who hate how
29
much control the federal government exercises over their State. The
control stems from the federal government's ownership of about 63%
of the land in Utah. 30 Bears Ears' creation sparked particular ire
because, as the Antiquities Act allows, Obama created it despite
opposition from Utah's elected officials. 31 Utah Senator Mike Lee
captured the ire when he said, after Obama created Bears Ears, "This
arrogant act by a lame duck president will not stand.... I will work
32
tirelessly ... [to] undo this designation."
Efforts by Senator Lee, Senator Orrin Hatch, and other opponents
of Bears Ears paid off less than a year after Obama created it.33
Within months of taking office, President Trump ordered Secretary of
34
the Interior Ryan Zinke to review certain monuments. In December
2017, less than one year after Bears Ears' creation, Trump issued
proclamations reducing Bears Ears and a second massive monument
35
in Utah, the Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument. Bears

See Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. at 1144 (establishing Bears Ears
28.
Commission composed of officers from "the Hopi Nation, Navajo Nation, Ute Mountain
Ute Tribe, Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah Ouray, and Zuni Tribe" to "partner with the
Federal agencies" responsible for administering Bears Ears); Complaint for Injunctive
and Declaratory Relief at 13-18, Hopi Tribe v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02590 (D.D.C. Dec.
4, 2017) (allegations describing tribal involvement in creation of Bears Ears).
See Eric Lipton & Lisa Friedman, Oil Was Central in Decision to Shrink
29.
Protected Utah Site, Emails Show, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2018, at All.
CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL
30.
LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 8 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R42346.pdf.
See generally San Juan County Comm'n, Comment on Notice of Review of
31.
2017),
1996 (May 25,
Established Since
Certain National Monuments
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOI-2017-0002-99611.
32. Meyer, supra note 25.
See Jesse Hyde, Behind the Scenes: How Hatch's Loyalty Pushed Trump to
33.
Undo Bears Ears, DESERET NEWS (May 5, 2017), https://www.deseretnews.coml
article/865679308/Behind-the-scenes-How-Hatchs-loyalty-pushed-Trump-to-undoBears-Ears.html (describing the role of Hatch and other Utah officials in getting
Trump to reduce Bears Ears).
Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (May 1, 2017).
34.
Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 8, 2017) (modifying Grand
35.
Escalante); Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 8, 2017) (modifying
Bears Ears).
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Ears was reduced by about 85%: from 1.35 million acres to about
200,000 acres.3 6 With that, the former winners became losers.37
But they did not take it lying down. And they found a champion
in a purveyor of puffy jackets and other outdoor apparel.
B. Patagonia'sLawsuit
Within hours of President Trump's announcement that he was
slashing Bears Ears, Patagonia replaced its usual internet home page
with this stark message: "The President Stole Your Land."3

8

A few

days later, Patagonia sued Trump over his reduction of Bears Ears. 39
Patagonia filed the suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.40 Joining Patagonia as co-plaintiffs in the suit
are seven nonprofit entities. 41 The suit names as defendants not only
President Trump but also four other federal officials.42 The suit claims
violations of the Antiquities Act and the Constitution's separation of

36. Dawsey & Eilperin, supra note 1. In reducing Bears Ears, Trump's
proclamation renamed the two remaining portions of it "the Indian Creek and Shash
Jda units." Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. at 58,085.
37. Katie Tubb, Commentary, In Big Win for Utah, Trump Scales Back Federal
Land Grab from Obama Administration, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.heritage.org/environment/commentary/big-win-utah-trump-scales-backfederal-land-grab-obama-administration.
38. PATAGONIA (Dec. 5, 2017, 12:00 AM), http://www.patagonia.com/home
[http://web.archive.org/web/20171205010613/www.patagonia.com/home];
Gelles,
supra note 2.
39. See UDB Compl., supranote 1.
40. Id. (caption).
41. Patagonia's co-plaintiffs are: (1) lead plaintiff Utah Din6 Bikdyah; (2) the
Conservation Lands Foundation, Inc.; (3) Friends of Cedar Mesa; (4) Archeology
Southwest; (5) the Access Fund; (6) the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the
United States; and (7) the Society of Vertebrate Paleontology. Id.
42. Besides Trump, the named defendants are Secretary of Interior Zinke;
Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue; Brian Steed, Deputy Director of the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM); and Tony Tooke, Chief of the U.S. Forest Service (FS). Id.
The presence of these other defendants reflects that some land in Bears Ears is
administered by the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the BLM, and the rest is
administered by the Secretary ofAgriculture, acting through the FS. See Zinke Interim
Report, supra note 22, at 4.
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powers doctrine and Take Care Clause. 43 The suit seeks declaratory
and injunctive relief restoring Bears Ears to its original size.44
As interesting and important as are the claims on the merits, the
issues of standing raised by Patagonia's suit are equally interesting,
and potentially more important. The merits claims all turn on
whether the Antiquities Act authorizes a president to reduce a
monument previously created under the Act. 45 That issue concerns
the proper interpretation of a single, albeit important, public land
law. 46 In contrast, the standing issues arise under Article III of the
U.S. Constitution, and they implicate a vast body of public-law
litigation. 47 The next section briefly describes Patagonia's standing
arguments and summarizes the Article III requirements for them.

43. The plaintiffs claim that the reduction of Bears Ears violates the Antiquities
Act because the Act authorizes the president only to create national monuments, not
to reduce or abolish them. UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 65-68 (Counts I and II).
Because the reduction is ultra vires, plaintiffs argue, it violates the separation of
powers by trespassing on Congress's power under the Property Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 68-69 (Count III). It violates the
Take Care Clause (U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3), the plaintiffs say, because President
Trump's ultra vires proclamation reducing Bears Ears is inconsistent with President
Obama's proclamation creating it. UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 69-70 (Count IV).
44. UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 70-71.
45. For discussion of whether the Antiquities Act authorizes the president to
reduce or abolish a monument previously created under the Act, see Richard H.
Seamon, DismantlingMonuments, 70 FLA. L. REV. 553 (2018).
The term "public land law" refers, roughly speaking, to laws for the
46.
administration of federally owned land. See Marla E. Mansfield, A Primerof Public
Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV. 801, 802-03 (1993).
47. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (explaining the
relation between personal standing requirements and the limitations of judicial
authority under Article III of the Constitution). "Public-law litigation comprises
lawsuits which seek to vindicate important social values that affect numerous
individuals and entities." Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the FederalRules of
Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 270 n.1 (1989). Unlike litigation arising from
"disputes between private parties about private rights," the "object" of public-law
litigation is "the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies." Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976).
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C. Patagonia'sStandingArguments and the Article III Requirements
Patagonia and its co-plaintiffs are organizations. 48 The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that an organization can sue both on
its own behalf and also in a representative capacity. 49 Reflecting that
precedent, Patagonia and several of its co-plaintiffs sue for themselves
as well as for certain "affiliates."50 Patagonia, in particular, sues forand alleges injury to-itself as well as "its employees and sponsored
athletes."5 1 Several of Patagonia's co-plaintiffs sue for-and allege
injury to-themselves as well as their "members." 52 Patagonia cannot
sue for its members, because it has no members in the usual sense.5 3
Unfortunately, the capacities in which an organization can sue,
and establish standing, lack stable shorthand names. 54 This Article
uses the terms used by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.

48.
The plaintiff in the lawsuit against Trump is "Patagonia Works." UDB
Compl., supra note 1, at 1 (caption). Although Patagonia Works describes itself in the
complaint as "an outdoor apparel company," id. ¶ 43, at 16, it describes itself on its
website as "the holding company for Patagonia, Inc. (apparel), Patagonia Provisions
(food), Patagonia Media (books, films and multimedia projects), and future
investments
and
joint
ventures."
FAQ,
PATAGONIA
WORKS,
http://www.patagoniaworks.com/faq/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2019). This Article uses
"Patagonia" to refer to the plaintiff.
49. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
50.
UIDB Compl., supra note 1, T 1, at 1.
51. Id. ¶ 51, at 19; id. ¶ 174, at 55.
52. See id. T 14-15, at 6; id. T 27, at 10; id. ¶ 35, at 13-14; id. ¶ 58, at 21; id. 1
64, at 23; id. T 71, at 25.
53.
As noted above, supra note 48, "Patagonia Works," a holding company, is the
named plaintiff. Patagonia Works' website describes the companies it holds as its
"member companies." FAQ, PATAGONIA WORKS, http://www.patagoniaworks.com/faq/.
But Patagonia does not appear to sue on behalf of those companies. Compare UDB
Compl., supra note 1, 1 1, at 1, T 174, at 55 (stating that the listed plaintiffs are
collectively suing "on behalf of themselves, their members, and other affiliates"), and
supra note 52 (listing the other listed plaintiffs' specific allegations of injury to
membership), with UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 16-19 (Patagonia Works alleging
individual injury without any mention of membership or injury to its members).
Moreover, the portion of the complaint that describes the plaintiffs identifies
"Patagonia Works" as "an outdoor apparel company," UDB Compl., supra note 1, 1 43,
at 16, a description that applies only to one of the member companies of the holding
company Patagonia Works. Although the matter is unclear, it seems that the named
plaintiff, Patagonia Works, is implicitly representing the member company that sells
clothing, which is, in turn, suing for itself and its employees and sponsored athletes.
54.
See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497-98 (2009)
(discussing "organizational standing"); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (using the term "representational or associational standing" to
discuss the same thing); cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("[The
constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not
susceptible of precise definition.").
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Circuit, in which Patagonia brought its suit against Trump. The D.C.
Circuit uses "organizational standing" when an organization sues for
injury to itself.55 The D.C. Circuit uses "third-party standing" when a
plaintiff asserts a third party's rights based on the plaintiffs
relationship with the third party.5 6 Finally, the D.C. Circuit uses the
term "associational standing" when an organization sues for injury to
57
its members or other constituents.
Whatever type of standing a plaintiff asserts, it must "satisfy the
familiar three-part test for Article III standing." 58 The organization
must show that it, or the third parties or other constituents whose
rights it seeks to assert, or both "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that
is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3)
59
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." For
organizational standing, the plaintiff-organization must show
60
For
traceable, redressable injury in fact to itself or its activities.
third-party standing, the plaintiff-organization must show traceable
injury in fact to itself, as well as traceable, redressable injury in fact
to the third party whose rights it seeks to assert. 6 ' Finally, for
associational standing, the plaintiff-organization need only show
traceable, redressable injury to its constituents; the plaintiff62
organization need not show traceable injury to itself. As a leading
treatise states, the plaintiff granted associational standing gets to
63
"borrow" the standing of a party not before the court.
Patagonia's suit challenges an action-Trump's reduction of Bears
Ears-that does not target the company or its constituents. In
lawsuits brought by plaintiffs that are not the target of the
defendants' challenged action, "standing is . . . ordinarily
substantially more difficult to establish."6 4 Patagonia thus faces a

See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FAA, 892 F.3d 1249, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
55.
See, e.g., Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352, 1360 (D.C.
56.
Cir. 2000). But see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.9.3, at 712 (using term
"relationship standing" for what D.C. Circuit calls "third-party standing").
57. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 892 F.3d at 1253.
58.
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018).
59. Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)).
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 892 F.3d at 1255.
60.
Am. ImmigrationLawyers Ass'n, 199 F.3d at 1360.
61.
62.
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 892 F.3d at 1253.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.9.5, at 875 (using the term
63.
"borrowed member standing" to describe what the D.C. Circuit calls "associational
standing"-i.e., cases in which organizations have standing based solely on their
members' injury).
64. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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hurdle in showing that Trump's action has a sufficiently direct and
personal effect on it or its constituents to constitute cognizable injury.
Patagonia faces another hurdle due to its unorthodox position as
a for-profit corporation seeking additional environmental protections.
A for-profit corporation like Patagonia usually sues the government
for over-protecting the environment. 65 In suing the government for
under-protecting the environment, Patagonia is behaving as if it were
a nonprofit environmental advocacy organization. Indeed, most of the
plaintiffs suing Trump for his reduction of the Utah monuments are
nonprofit environmental advocacy organizations.6 6 Partly because
Patagonia is not one of the usual suspects, it has gotten more
attention than the other plaintiffs.6 7 For the same reason, Patagonia's
arguments for standing are necessarily bold, and a court decision
upholding its standing would be momentous. It would enable a whole
new class of plaintiffs-deep-pocketed, for-profit organizations that
market themselves as socially responsible-to sue the government for
activities adverse to those plaintiffs' social justice agenda.

65.
See generally Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
66.
Patagonia's lawsuit is one of five lawsuits challenging Trump's reduction of
Bears Ears or Grand Staircase. The others are: (1) Hopi Tribe v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv02590 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017); (2) Wilderness Soc'y v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02587 (D.D.C.
Dec. 4, 2017); (3) Grand Staircase Escalante Partners v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02591EGS (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017); and (4) Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv02606 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2017). All told, fifteen of the twenty-five plaintiffs in these
lawsuits are nonprofit environmental organizations.
67.
See Kim Bhasin & Polly Mosendz, Patagonia and the Big Business of
Fighting Trump, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-12-08/patagonia-and-the-big-business-of-fighting-trump
("Similar
cases have been brought by environmental groups and Native American tribes, but
Patagonia is the first retailer to get embroiled in such litigation."); Gelles, supra note
2 (discussing Patagonia's suit without mentioning Patagonia's co-plaintiffs); Abha
Bhattari, PatagoniaIs Suing the President-And Drawing Ire from Republicans in
Congress, WASH. POST (Dec.
12,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.coml
news/business/wp/2017/12/12/patagonia-is-suing-the-president-and-drawing-irefrom-republicans-in-congress/?utmterm=.c95d1b1da3f9 (same).
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II. WHETHER PATAGONIA HAS ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING UNDER
CURRENT LAW

A. Current Law of OrganizationalStanding

'

To sue in federal court on their own behalf, organizations must
meet the same standing requirements as individuals and can do so
based on the same types of injury. 68 For example, a corporation can
69
challenge a government regulation that causes it economic injury.
Besides economic injuries, an organization can sue the government
for injuring its constitutional rights. 70 Relevant to Patagonia's suit
against Trump, the Court has found standing in lawsuits brought by
organizations that claimed injury from presidential actions. 7
Besides traditional injuries, the Court has found standing for
organizations based on "interests that would seem rather abstract to
many observers." 72 The leading case is Havens Realty Corp. 6.
Coleman.73
One of the plaintiffs in Havens was a nonprofit organization,
"Housing Opportunities Made Equal" (HOME).74 HOME counseled
and gave referrals to low- and moderate-income people seeking
housing around Richmond, Virginia.7 5 HOME sued a Richmond-area
landlord, Havens Realty, for falsely telling HOME's black employee
"tester," and one of HOME's black clients, that Havens had no
vacancies in one of its apartment complexes. 76 HOME claimed that
those falsehoods were part of Havens' efforts to "steer" black renters
to one complex and white renters to a different complex.77 HOME
argued that this racial steering violated its right under the Fair
78
Housing Act to truthful information about housing vacancies.
HOME also alleged that the violation injured it by "frustrat[ing] the

&

See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982) ("In
68.
determining whether [the plaintiff-organization] has standing . .. , we conduct the
same inquiry as in the case of an individual.").
E.g., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970) (per curiam).
69.
E.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341-46 (2014).
70.
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2406 (2018); Youngstown Sheet
71.
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952).
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.9.5, at 858.
72.
455 U.S. 363 (1982); see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.9.5, at 858
73.
(describing Havens as "[t]he leading illustration" of a decision according "the
protection of standing to" fairly "abstract" interests).
74. Havens, 455 U.S. at 367.
Id. at 368.
75.
Id.
76.
Id. at 369.
77.

78.

Id.
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organization's counseling and referral services, with a consequent
drain on resources."7 9
The Court held that this organizational injury gave HOME
standing to seek money damages.8 0 The Court determined that
Havens' "steering practices have perceptibly impaired HOME's ability
to give counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income
home-seekers."81 The Court held that "[s]uch concrete and
demonstrable injury to the organization's activities-with the
consequent drain on the organization's resources-constitutes far
more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social
interests."8 2 Thus, HOME's injury differed from the mere interest in
a problem that the Court had, in an earlier case, held insufficient to
give an environmental organization standing. 83
As discussed below, Patagonia cannot establish organizational
standing under current law.
B. Patagonia'sAllegations of OrganizationalInjury
Patagonia alleges that Trump's reduction of Bears Ears "will
cause Patagonia to suffer an immediate and irreparable injury." 84
Patagonia says it will suffer this injury "[bly virtue of' three
circumstances:
[i] its long history in the region, [ii] its statutory
purposes and obligations as a California benefit
corporation that require Patagonia to use its business
to conserve public lands like Bears Ears, [and] [iii] its
substantial investment of financial support, and
employee time, into the establishment and defense of
the Bears Ears National Monument.8 s
It elaborates on each circumstance.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 378-79. In the lower courts, HOME had sought injunctive relief only
as a representative of its members, and had abandoned its claim of representational
standing by the time the case reached the Court. Id. at 378.
81.
Id. at 379.
82.
Id.
83.
Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
84.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, 1 50, at 19.

85.

Id.
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Patagonia attributes its "long history in the Bears Ears area" to
that area's offering "some of the best rock climbing in North
America."86 This virtue, Patagonia explains, has led its employees,
sponsored athletes, and customers to visit the area "for various
purposes, including . . . product testing, marketing, professional
training, fitness, education, recreation, [and] spiritual and aesthetic
enjoyment." 87 Patagonia asserts that its "workforce and many of its
88
customers intend to visit Bears Ears in the future."
Patagonia also asserts that it has legal duties as "a California
benefit corporation."8 9 Those duties are to:
(i) contribute one-percent (1%) of its annual net
revenue to non-profit charitable organizations that
and
conservation
environmental
promote
sustainability; (ii) create a material positive impact on
society and the environment[;] and (iii) consider the
impact of any action on its workforce, customers and
the environment.9 0
To satisfy those duties, Patagonia explains, it has given money to
environmental groups "that have galvanized local support for" Bears
Ears and other monuments.9 1 Patagonia says it has also supported
these groups by "using its own marketing platforms and employee
time to advocate for their shared conservation goals" and "provid[ing]
tactical support" for them, 92 such as "hosting a bi-annual 'Tools for
where it brings together
Grassroots Activists' conference,
environmental nonprofits with advocacy experts to train nonprofit
93
employees on executing their mission."
Patagonia adds that, besides supporting groups interested in
Bears Ears, Patagonia has directly invested money and employee time
into creating and protecting Bears Ears.94 The efforts include making
movies about the area; advocating for the area's protection through
its "marketing channels"; organizing "phone, social media and letter-

86.
Id. T 46, at 17.
Id.
87.
Id. T 46, at 18.
88.
Id. ¶ 43, at 16 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600-14631 (West 2018)). See
89.
generally J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia:Mergers and Acquisitions with
Benefit Corporations,9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 487-89 (2012).
UJDB Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 43, at 16-17.
90.
Id. T 44-45, at 17.
91.
Id. T 44, at 17.
92.
Id. ¶ 44, at 17.
93.
94. Id. T 47, at 18.
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writing campaigns"; and meeting with state and federal officials. 95 In
addition, Patagonia's CEO helped develop "a unified industry position
in support of Bears Ears." 96 Patagonia's founder wrote op-eds
supporting Bears Ears' creation.9 7 Now that Trump has downsized
Bear Ears, Patagonia alleges, it "will be forced to divert more
resources away from other organizational activities in support of
conservation and social equity and towards protection and restoration
of... the Bears Ears National Monument."98
In sum, Patagonia rests its claim of organizational injury on (1)
its "long history" with the Bears Ears region; (2) its status as a public
benefit corporation; and (3) the time and attention it has devotedand must continue to devote-to advocating for Bears Ears. The next
section analyzes whether those grounds establish the "injury in fact"
required by Article III, and concludes they do not.
C. Analysis of Patagonia'sOrganizationalStandingAllegations
Under Current Law
1. Patagonia's "Long History" in the Bears Ears Area
Patagonia's first argument for standing rests on its "long history"
in the Bears Ears area." But under Sierra Club v. Morton, mere
history with an area cannot establish organizational standing.10 0
In Sierra Club, the Club sued the federal government over the
federal government's approval of a ski resort on federal land in the
Mineral King Valley of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.1 0 ' The Club did
not "allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their
activities or pastimes by the [resort's] development." 1 02 Instead, the
Court described the Club as asserting standing because of its "special
interest" in preserving "national parks, game refuges, and forests."1o 3
The Court held that the Club's "special interest" did not constitute the
injury in fact necessary to give the Club organizational standing.1 04

95.
Id. ¶T 48-49, at 18-19.
96.
Id. ¶ 49, at 19.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. ¶ 50, at 19.
99.
Id. T 46, at 17.
100.
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
101. Id. at 728-30.
102. Id. at 735.
103. Id. at 730.
104. Id. at 739-40. The specific issue in Sierra Club was whether the Club could
seek federal-court review of federal agency action under Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at
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Patagonia's claims of organizational standing seemingly differ
from the Sierra Club's in two ways. First, Patagonia asserts a
10 5
In
longstanding interest specifically in "the Bears Ears area."
more
as
relying,
Club
contrast, the Court described the Sierra
generally, on an interest in preserving "national parks, game refuges,
and forests."106 Second, Patagonia connects its "long history" in the
area to the use of the Bears Ears area by people associated with the
107
In
company: its employees, customers, and sponsored athletes.
contrast, "[n]owhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the [Sierra]
10 8
But
Club state that its members use Mineral King for any purpose."
neither apparent difference matters.
Despite the Court's description in the Sierra Club opinion, the
Club did not assert just a broad interest in national parks, game
refuges, and forests.100 To the contrary, the Club repeatedly referred
to its specific interest in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. In its
complaint, the Club claimed that one of its "principal [sic] purposes"
was "to protect and conserve the [natural] resources of the Sierra
Nevada Mountains." 1 0 Consistent with that claim, the court of
appeals had analyzed (and rejected) the Club's standing based on the
Club's "assert[ion] that it has for many years taken a special
interest ... particularly [in] lands on the slopes of the Sierra Nevada
[M]ountains."' The Club repeated this "special interest" when
petitioning the Court for certiorari. 1 12 Similarly, counsel for the Club
emphasized at oral argument before the Court that the Club "has

732-33. In earlier cases, the Court had held that a plaintiff seeking review under
Section 10 of the APA must show that the defendant's challenged conduct caused the
plaintiff "injury in fact" and that the injury "was to an interest arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statutes that the [defendant] w[as]
claimed to have violated." Id. at 733 (internal quotation marks omitted). The "injury
in fact" required for review under Section 10 of the APA is the same "injury in fact"
that Article III requires for standing. This equivalence is shown by later cases in which
the Court cites Sierra Club as addressing Article III's injury in fact requirement. E.g.,
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
UDB Compl., supra note 1, T 46, at 17.
105.
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 730.
106.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 46, at 17.
107.
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735.
108.
Id. at 730.
109.
Appendix 4, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (No. 70-34)
110.
(reproducing Sierra Club's Complaint, paragraph 3 of which makes the allegation
quoted in the text accompanying this note).
Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 29 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd sub nom Sierra
111.
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
112. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 2, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
(No. 70-34).
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worked to preserve the lands of Sequoia National Park and Mineral
King since its founding." 113 The U.S. Supreme Court's references to
the Club's more general interest in national parks, game refuges, and
forests presumably reflects that the Club's interest in the specific
geographic area where the challenged development was to occur did
not affect the Court's analysis of the Club's organizational standing.
Thus, Patagonia's "long history in the Bears Ears area" does not
meaningfully differ from the Sierra Club's "special interest" in the
Sierra Nevada Mountains. If anything, Patagonia's ties to Bears Ears
area are weaker than the Sierra Club's ties to the Sierra Nevada
Mountains. Unlike the Sierra Club, Patagonia cannot claim that it
has had an interest in the allegedly affected area since its founding. 114
Nor can Patagonia claim that one of its "princip[le] purposes" is to
protect the area. 115 It therefore follows a fortiori from the Court's
rejection of organizational standing in Sierra Club that Patagonia's
"long history" in the Bears area cannot establish organizational
standing.

16

Patagonia would not have organizational standing even if it
proved that its employees, customers, and sponsored athletes use
Bears Ears, as the asserted injury to those individuals' use of the area
does not injure Patagonia itself. Patagonia does not claim, for
example, that injury to its employees' use of the area for product
testing and marketing will hurt the company's ability to test products
or market them.11 7 Because injury to employees' use of Bears Ears
113.
Oral Argument Transcript, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (No.
70-34), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-34;
id. (counsel for Sierra Club
emphasizing that "[t]he Club in this case did in fact allege its special interest in the
[geographic] area involved" and that "no one ... at the District Court level had any
question ...
as to the deep involvement of the club with Sequoia National Park and
Mineral King, so that a case or controversy would be assured").
114.
Cf. id. See generally Oliver Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
867, 911-12 (2002) (describing the role of famous naturalist John Muir in the
formation of the Sierra Club and the Club's connection to preservation of the Sierra
Nevada Mountains).
115.
Appendix 4, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (No. 70-34)
(reproducing Sierra Club's Complaint, paragraph 3 of which makes the allegation
quoted in the text accompanying this note).
116.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, 1 46, at 17.
117.
Patagonia probably could not plausibly claim that its ability to test and
market products has been hurt by Trump's reduction of Bears Ears. To do so,
Patagonia would have to show that specific areas of Bears Ears excluded by Trump's
reduction of the monument have special features that do not exist elsewhere and that
face imminent threat of being altered by the reduction in ways that prevent their use
for Patagonia's purposes. Cf. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 765 (9th Cir. 2017)
(holding that State of Hawaii had standing to challenge executive order restricting
entry of certain aliens because of injury to state university's ability to attract diverse
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does not injure Patagonia, that use is irrelevant to Patagonia's
organizational standing.1 1 8
2. Patagonia's Status as a Public Benefit Corporation
Patagonia's status as a public benefit corporation also does not
give it organizational standing. Patagomia asserts that this status
obligates it to (1) give money to environmental causes; (2) create a
"material positive impact" on society and the environment; and (3)
consider the impact of its actions on its workforce, customers, and the
environment.11 9 Patagonia also asserts that to comply with the first
obligation it has given money to groups that supported the creation of
Bears Ears. 120 Each activity is separately analyzed below.
First, under Sierra Club, neither Patagonia's general interest in
the environment nor its specific interest in Bears Ears gives it
to
contributions
Patagonia's
standing.1 2 1
organizational
environmental causes show its organizational interest in actions that
harm the environment, but President Trump's reduction of Bears
Ears does not affect Patagonia's ability to contribute to environmental
causes, including to the protection of Bears Ears. Thus, Patagonia's
contributions cannot establish organizational injury traceable to
Trump's action.
Second, under Allen v. Wright, Patagonia's duty to create a
material positive impact on society and the environment is too
generalized to establish organizational standing. 122 In Allen, parents
of black public school children sued the federal government for
granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private
schools.1 23 The parents claimed injury from "the mere fact of
24
Government financial aid to discriminatory private schools."1 The
Court understood this as "a claim of stigmatic injury . .. suffered by
all members of a racial group when the Government discriminates on

students and faculty), vacated on other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); Coal. for
Mercury-Free Drugs v. Sebelius, 671 F.3d 1275, 1281-83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (consumers
lacked standing to challenge FDA's refusal to ban thimerosal-preserved vaccines
because they had not shown that they could not readily obtain thimerosal-free vaccines
at a reasonable price).
118. As discussed below, however, their use of Bears Ears is relevant to
Patagonia's associational standing. See infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, T 43, at 16-17.
119.
120. Id. T 44-45, at 17.
See supra Section II.C.1.
121.
468 U.S. 737 (1984).
122.
123. Id. at 739.
124. Id. at 752.
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the basis of race." 1 2 5 The Court recognized that "this sort of
noneconomic injury is one of the most serious consequences of
discriminatory government action."1 26 But the Court held that the
parents lacked standing because they had not been personally
discriminated against by the private schools that enjoyed tax-exempt
status. 127 Their children, for example, had not been denied admission
to those schools because of their race. 128 The Court explained that
without a showing of personal injury the plaintiffs' claim was not
cognizable:
If the abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable,
standing would extend nationwide to all members of
the particular racial groups against which the
Government was alleged to be discriminating by its
grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory
school, regardless of the location of that school.... A
black person in Hawaii could challenge the grant of a
tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school in
Maine. Recognition of standing in such circumstances
would transform the federal courts into no more than
a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
concerned bystanders. Constitutional limits on the role
of the federal courts preclude such a transformation. 129
So too here, Patagonia's asserted duty to create a material positive
impact on the environment does not give it standing to challenge, in
federal court, every action that it thinks will have a material negative
impact on the environment. A contrary conclusion would enable every
person or company that felt duty-bound to protect the environment to
challenge every governmental action that was thought to threaten the
environment, regardless of location. An environmentalist in Maine
could challenge a government action in Hawaii without showing that
the action caused personal injury. 3 o If that were possible, the federal

125.
126.

Id. at 754.
Id. at 755.

127.

Id.

128.
Id. at 746.
129.
Id. at 755-56 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
130.
Cf. Joseph L. Sax, Standing to Sue: A Critical Review of the Mineral King
Decision, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 76, 84 (1973) (criticizing Court's decision in Sierra

Club because it would not "allow an individual citizen of Florida, for example, to sue
to enforce laws protecting the Alaskan wilderness").
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courts would become "no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the
value interests of concerned bystanders." 131
Patagonia presumably will emphasize that it has carried out its
duty by giving money specifically to groups that supported the
creation of Bears Ears.1 32 Patagonia would then argue that these
efforts to do its duty have been thwarted by Trump's reduction of
Bears Ears.133 That argument overlaps with Patagonia's assertion of
standing based on its own, direct efforts to protect Bears Ears, as
discussed below. 134 The argument is flawed because the failure of
one's advocacy efforts is not injury in fact under Article III.
Finally, Patagonia's duty to consider the impact of its actions on
its employees, customers, and the environment is not injured by
Trump's reduction of Bears Ears. Trump's action does not prevent
Patagonia from contributing to whomever it likes or from considering
the consequences of its actions. Under standing doctrine, it has no
traceable injury in fact.
3. Patagonia's Diversion of Resources for Continued Advocacy Efforts
Patagonia states that it has devoted money and employee time to
advocating for Bears Ears. 3 5 Patagonia also claims that it must
continue diverting resources to these self-described "advocacy efforts"
because of Trump's reduction of Bears Ears.36 These claims are
modeled after those found sufficient for organizational standing in
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.13 7 But Patagonia's claims are
altogether different.
Recall that in Havens, the plaintiff-organization HOME alleged
that the defendant Havens Realty injured HOME's housing
counseling and referral activities by giving false information to a
HOME employee and a HOME client about vacancies in Havens'
apartment complexes.1 38 The Court held that these allegations
established traceable injury in fact to HOME:

Allen, 468 U.S. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, 1 47, at 18.
132.
Id. $T 49-50, at 19.
133.
134. See infra Section II.C.3.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 18-19.
135.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 18, 19.
136.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) (quoting Warth
137.
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
138. Id. at 368.
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If, as broadly alleged, petitioners' steering practices
have perceptibly impaired HOME's ability to provide
counseling and referral services for low- and moderateincome home-seekers, there can be no question that
the organization has suffered injury in fact. Such
concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization's
activities-with the consequent drain on the
organization's resources-constitutes far more than
simply a setback to the organization's abstract social
interests.1 39
Havens does not control this case for three reasons: First, the
nature of the organization's activities and the nature of the alleged
injury are significantly different. Second, Havens arose from a lawsuit
against a private defendant, whereas Patagonia's suit is against the
federal government. Finally, Havens related to private rights, while
Patagonia is asserting public rights.
Patagonia's activities and injuries are significantly different than
HOME's. In Havens, the plaintiff, HOME, claimed injury to its
counseling and referral activities that helped individuals find
homes. 1 4 0 Patagonia claims injury to its "advocacy efforts" to preserve
and protect Bears Ears. 141 What Patagonia calls "advocacy efforts,"
the D.C. Circuit calls "pure issue-advocacy."1 42 The D.C. Circuit has
repeatedly and correctly held that "[i]mpediments to pure issueadvocacy cannot establish standing." 143

139. Id. at 379 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).
140.
See Havens, 455 U.S. at 369.
141.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, at 19; see supra Section II.C.1 for a summary of
the advocacy efforts.
142.
E.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FAA, 892 F.3d 1249, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
143. Id.; accord Food & Water Watch v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 919-20 (D.C. Cir.
2015); Nat'1 Ass'n of Home Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ctr. for
Law & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1161-62 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The D.C.
Circuit has in two cases suggested that it has sometimes upheld Havens standing
based on an organization's assertion of injury to its advocacy efforts. Am. Soc'y for
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
("[Miany of our cases finding Havens standing involved activities that could just as
easily be characterized as advocacy-and, indeed, sometimes are."), quoted in PETA
v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087, 1094 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In the cases to which the court
referred, however, the court upheld organizational standing based on harm to
organizational activities in addition to pure issue advocacy, such as counselling
individuals. See Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., Inc., 633 F.3d 1136, 1140 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (denying standing to organization in that case but discussing cases upholding
organizational standing where organizations claimed that defendant's conduct
required more organizational expenditures for counseling clients); Abigail All. for
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This holding follows from Sierra Club v. Morton.144 There, the
Court held that an organization's "special interest" in preserving
public land did not give it standing to challenge government action
adverse to that interest.1 45 A special-interest organization like the
Sierra Club inevitably advances that interest by advocating for it.146
If a special-interest organization could bypass the holding of Sierra
Club merely by claiming that advocacy efforts to advance its interest
have failed, Sierra Club would be meaningless.
Still, an organization's advocacy efforts could be injured in a way
that would constitute injury in fact. Suppose the federal government
made a rule barring companies from using their websites to criticize
the federal government. That rule would impair Patagonia's advocacy
efforts by barring messages like the one-'The Government Stole
Your Land."-that Patagonia posted after Trump reduced Bears
Ears.1 47 That rule would cause cognizable injury by "ma[king] the
organization's activities more difficult." 148 But Patagonia cannot claim
injury merely because its advocacy efforts to protect Bears Ears
49
suffered a setback when Trump reduced the Bears Ears monument.1

Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (alleging impairment to organization's counselling and referral activities);
Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (organizations claimed
increased "[e]xpenditures to reach out to potential home buyers or renters who are
steered away from housing opportunities by discriminatory advertising . . . ."). Thus,
D.C. Circuit case law suggests uncertainty about what constitutes "pure issueadvocacy" but not about the principle that the lack of success of an organization's
advocacy efforts does not constitute injury in fact. Elec. PrivacyInfo. Ctr., 892 F.3d at
1255.
144. See generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
145. Id. at 739-41.
146. See Appendix 4, Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727 (No. 70-34) (reproducing
complaint, paragraph three of which alleged that "[flor many years the SIERRA CLUB
by its activities and conduct has exhibited a special interest in the conservation and
the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country")
(emphasis added). See generally Houck, supra note 114, at 912-20 (describing Sierra
Club's efforts to protect Mineral King Valley, which stretched back to 1893).
147. See Gelles, supra note 2
148. Natl Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1430 (D.C. Cir.
1996); cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 424-26, 428 (1963) (holding that NAACP
had organizational standing to challenge Virginia law that treated NAACP's activities
as the "improper solicitation of legal business" and explaining that NAACP is directly
engaged in "those activities ... which the statute would curtail").
149. Besides claiming a setback to its past "advocacy efforts" for Bears Ears, UDB
Compl., supra note 1, at 18, Patagonia alleges that Trump's reduction of Bears Ears
has led Patagonia to "divert resources" to advocacy efforts seeking the restoration of
Bears Ears' original boundaries. Id. at 19. Patagonia's diversion of resources is a
voluntary decision. As such, it cannot constitute injury in fact. E.g., Elec. Privacy Info.
Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm'n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 379 (D.C.
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III. THE COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT HAVENS DOES NOT APPLY TO
SUITS SEEKING TO VINDICATE PUBLIC RIGHTS, LIKE PATAGONIA'S.

Under current law, the Court purports to apply its "familiar threepart test" for standing-which requires traceable, redressable injuryin-fact-in all federal court cases.15 0 As Professor Richard Fallon has
explained, however, this articulation of a one-size-fits-all standing
test does not reflect reality.1'5 In reality, the Court analyzes standing
differently depending on the type of case. 152 One type of case that
deserves, and which the Court has implicitly given, distinctive
treatment is private actions to vindicate public rights.1 53 Patagonia's
suit against Trump seeks to vindicate public rights, and Patagonia's
organizational standing should be analyzed accordingly. 154 Its
organizational standing should not be analyzed under Havens Realty
v. Coleman because Havens concerned private rights.15 5 The Court
should clarify that Havens does not apply to suits seeking to vindicate
public rights. The clarification is needed because lower federal courts
regularly apply Havens to suits seeking to vindicate public rights. 156

Cir. 2017); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 418 (2013) (holding
that costs incurred by plaintiffs because of their subjective but unsubstantiated fear
of government surveillance was "self-inflicted" injury not traceable to the government);
cf. Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1156 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005). See generally
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.5, at 356-62 & n.73.
150. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Fragmentationof Standing, 93 TEX. L. REv. 1061, 1067 (2015) ("Since the 1970s, the
Court has recited its tripartite demand for injury in fact, causation, and redressability
with mind-numbing regularity, as if all, or nearly all, of standing doctrine could be
divided into just three parts."); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and
PrivateRights, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 275, 277 (2008) ("The Court has . . . proclaimed a
one-size-fits-all standing doctrine.").
151. Fallon, supra note 150, at 1068 ("Far from becoming more elegant and
unified, standing doctrine has grown more complex and variegated with nearly every
recent Supreme Court Term."); see also Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO.
L.J. 1191, 1195 (2014) (arguing that the Court is "wrong to view modern standing
doctrine as a single-minded inquiry into the adequacy of a plaintiffs injury").
152. See Fallon, supra note 150, at 1068-92 (describing areas of law in which the
Court applies distinctive standing requirements).
153. See Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1552 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("[D]ifferences between legal claims brought by private plaintiffs for the
violation of public and private rights underlie modern standing doctrine.").
154. See Section II.C.3.
155. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 377 (1982) (explaining
that although HOME could not receive standing for the "entire Richmond metropolitan
area," the organization could vindicate the rights of a "relatively compact
neighborhood").
156. In particular, the D.C. Circuit regularly applies Havens in suits to vindicate
public rights. E.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm'n on Election
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Scholars have shown that at common law, courts distinguished
suits asserting "private rights" from suits to vindicate "public
rights." 5 7 To use Blackstone's definition, "public rights" belong "to the
whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate
capacity." 58 Public rights "may include interests generally shared,
such as those in the free navigation of waterways, passage on public
highways, and general compliance with regulatory law."15 9 Private

Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 374, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (suit against a federal entity for
failing to conduct privacy assessment supposedly required by federal statute); League
of Women Voters of the U.S. States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (APA suit
against federal election official claiming violation of federal statute on voter
registration); Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989, 990, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(suit alleging violation of Endangered Species Act); PETA v. USDA, 797 F.3d 1087,
1089, 1093-97 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (suit asserting violation of Animal Welfare Act);
Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC, 786 F.3d 18, 21, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (suit asserting
violation of Federal Power Act). Other courts have also applied Havens to analyze
organizational standing in suits to vindicate public rights. See, e.g., Citizens for
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 189-90 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (suit asserting violation of Domestic and Foreign Emoluments Clauses, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8); Cornucopia Inst. v. USDA, 260 F. Supp.
3d 1061, 1064, 1067 (W.D. Wisc. 2017) (suit asserting violations of federal APA,
Organic Food Production Act of 1990, and Federal Advisory Committee Act); Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. USDA, 223 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1013, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (suit
asserting violation of Poultry Product Inspection Act); PETA v. Miami Seaquarium,
189 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1332, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (suit asserting violation of
Endangered Species Act), aff'd, 879 F.3d 1142, 1146 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2018); Puget
Soundkeeper All. v. Rainier Petroleum Corp., 138 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1174-75 (W.D..
Wash. 2015) (citizen suit alleging violation of Clean Water Act); PennEnvironment v.
PPG Indus., 23 F. Supp. 3d 553, 556-57, 587 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citizen suit alleging
violation of federal Clean Water Act and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act);
Slockish v. U.S. Fed. Highway Admin., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1182, 1201 (D. Or. 2010)
(suit alleging violations of National Environmental Policy Act, National Historic
Preservation Act, and Department of Transportation Act).
See Hessick, supra note 150, at 289 ("Standing grew out of the distinction
157.
between public and private rights."); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History
Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 693 (2004) (stating that "much of
the traditional discourse about standing was cast in terms of the distinction between
). But cf. James E. Pfander, Standing to Sue:
'public rights' and 'private rights'....
Lessons from Scotland's Actio Popularis, 66 DUKE L.J. 1493, 1500 (2017) (describing
Scotland's Sessions Court's entertainment of "actio popularis"-public action-in
which private plaintiffs sued to assert public rights); James E. Pfander & Daniel D.
Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1631-49 (2011)
(discussing influence of Scottish law on the generation that framed the U.S.
Constitution, as compared to influence of Blackstone's Commentaries).
4 WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5.
158.
Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 157, at 693; see also, e.g., Holyoke Co. v.
159.
Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 500, 506 (1872) (stating that uses of rivers for navigation,
fishing, and generating power "may be and often are regarded as public rights"); Smith
v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74-75 (1855) (stating that soil below low-water
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rights, unlike public rights, are held by individuals. They "include an
individual's common law rights in property and bodily integrity, as
well as in enforcing contracts."1 6 0 At common law, suits asserting
private rights were brought by private plaintiffs, whereas suits
asserting public rights generally could be brought only by the King or
his delegate or, in this country, by the government. 16 1
Despite the history distinguishing who could assert private rights
and who could assert public rights, no member of the Court said the
distinction should affect standing analysis until Justice Thomas said
so in a concurring opinion in Spokeo v. Robins. 162 As discussed next,
Justice Thomas's concurrence in Spokeo shows three things relevant
to Patagonia's suit against Trump. First, Patagonia's suit seeks to
vindicate public rights. Second, the leading case relevant to
Patagonia's assertion of organizational standing, Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman, is a suit asserting private rights. 163 Third, because of that
difference, Patagonia's organizational standing should not be
governed by Havens.
Spokeo was a private action under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act. 164 Plaintiff Thomas Robins claimed that defendant Spokeo, which
operates a "people search engine," violated the Act by reporting
inaccurate information about him.16 5 Mr. Robins sued under the
provision in the Act that authorizes private actions to recover either
"actual damages" or statutory damages of one hundred dollars to one

mark of Chesapeake Bay was held by Maryland "subject to ... certain public rights,
among which is the common liberty of taking fish").
160.
Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 157, at 693.
161.
See Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (stating that at common law, in general "only the government had the
authority to vindicate a harm borne by the public at large, such as the violation of the
criminal laws"); see also United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 610 (1941)
(stating that Congress in the Clayton Act "recognized the distinction between
proceedings initiated by the Government to vindicate public rights and actions by
private litigants for damages"); Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 158-59 (1905)
(referring to right of visitation as a "public right" that "exist[s] in the state for the
purpose of examining into the conduct of a corporation," and contrasting it with "the
private right of the shareholder to have an examination of the business in which he is
interested").
162.
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550-54 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2428 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing his concurrence
in Spokeo in stating that at common law, "[a] plaintiff could not bring a suit vindicating
public rights .. . without a showing of some specific injury to himself').
163.
455 U.S. 363, 377 (1982).
164. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544.
165.
Id. at 1546 (explaining that Robins alleged Spokeo inaccurately reported
that he was in his fifties, married with children, and relatively wealthy).
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thousand dollars for each violation. 16 6 The Court held that Mr. Robins
lacked standing to sue for statutory damages unless he could show
concrete injury or a "real risk" of concrete injury. 1 67 The Court added
that concrete injury can include "an intangible harm," and that "[i]n
determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact,
both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles."1 68
History includes, of course, the distinction between public rights and
private rights that Justice Thomas discussed in his concurrence. 6 9
Justice Thomas concurred "to explain how, in [his] view, the
injury-in-fact requirement applies to different types of rights." 7 0 He
explained, "Common-law courts more readily entertained suits from
private plaintiffs who alleged a violation of their own rights, in
contrast to private plaintiffs who asserted claims vindicating public
rights."' 7 ' Justice Thomas cited Blackstone and modern scholars to
explain the difference between public rights and private rights.1 72 He
also quoted Blackstone's statement that private plaintiffs suing for
violations of public rights had to show the violation caused them
"some extraordinary damage[s], beyond the rest of the
[community]."173

Justice Thomas also argued that "[tihese differences between legal
claims brought by private plaintiffs for the violation of public and
private rights underlie modern standing doctrine."1 74 He explained,
'The Court has said time and again that, when a plaintiff seeks to
vindicate a public right, the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered
a 'concrete' injury particular to himself."1 75 He added that the
concrete-injury requirement "applies with special force" when the
private plaintiff seeking to vindicate public rights sues the federal
executive branch to require it to "follow the law." 7 6 By contrast,
Justice Thomas wrote, "the concrete-harm requirement does not apply
as rigorously when a private plaintiff seeks to vindicate his own
private rights."1 77 In suits for violations of private rights, Justice

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
WILLIAM
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 1545.
Id. at 1548-49.
Id. at 1548.
Id. at 1550-54 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1550 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1551-52 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting 3
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTrARES *220).
Id. at 1552 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Thomas said, the Court "ha[d] not required a plaintiff to assert an
actual injury beyond the violation of his personal legal rights to satisfy
the 'injury-in-fact' requirement."1 7 8
Justice Thomas is right to say that modern standing law reflects,
albeit implicitly, the difference between public rights and private
rights. The difference shows up in two ways. First, the Court
repeatedly refuses to hear "generalized grievances"-i.e., injuries
shared in common with the public.179 Second, and relatedly, the Court
decides standing based on the separation of powers doctrine, a
doctrine that requires suits for violations of public rights to be treated
differently from suits for violations of private rights. 80
These two aspects of the precedent appear in a famous case from
the dawn of the modern standing era as well as in the leading modern
case on standing. The cases are, respectively, Frothingham v. Mellon
and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.18 1
178. Id. It would seem odd that Justice Thomas concurred if you focused only on
the statement he made in the text that accompanies this note. The statement in full
is: "Our contemporary decisions have not required a plaintiff to assert an actual injury
beyond the violation of his personal legal rights." Id. It appeared to be undisputed that
the statute at issue in Spokeo, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, gives people, like the
plaintiff Mr. Robins, a personal legal right to have companies like Spokeo report only
accurate information about themselves. See id. at 1545-46, 1548. Therefore, according
to the statement of Justice Thomas quoted above, it would seem that Mr. Robins had
adequately pleaded injury in fact by asserting a violation of his personal legal rights
under the Act. Yet that conclusion conflicts with the whole point of the majority's
opinion, which was that proof of a violation of the Act was not enough to give Mr.
Robins standing; Mr. Robins also had to show the violation caused or created an actual
or real risk of concrete harm. Id. at 1549. In truth, although the statement of Justice
Thomas quoted above suggests-contrary to the majority's opinion-that a violation
of the Act alone sufficed to confer injury in fact, elsewhere Justice Thomas says, more
equivocally, "[T]he concrete-harm requirement does not apply as rigorously when a
private plaintiff seeks to vindicate his own private rights." Id. at 1552 (emphasis
added). This latter statement, unlike the first one quoted in this note, is consistent
with the majority's holding that, besides a violation of a statutorily created private
right, the plaintiff must show that the violation created concrete harm or a risk of it.
179. E.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) ("Our refusal to serve as a
forum for generalized grievances has a lengthy pedigree.").
180. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
181. See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Massachusettsv. Mellon consolidated two suits, one by
Massachusetts and the other by Ms. Frothingham as a federal taxpayer. 262 U.S. at
478. The Court sometimes cites the part of its decision addressing the taxpayer's claim
as Frothingham v. Mellon. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225 (2011). In
Defenders of Wildlife, however, the Court cited the Frothingham case as
"Massachusettsv. Mellon." 504 U.S. at 574. On the prominence of Frothingham and
Defenders of Wildlife, see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.1, at 53 (describing
Massachusetts v. Mellon-referring to it by the name of the consolidated case
Frothingham v. Mellon-as "preeminent among the early decisions limiting
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182
She challenged a
Harriet Frothingliam was a federal taxpayer.
federal statute that gave states money to reduce maternal and infant
mortality. 183 The Court held that her interest as a federal taxpayer
was "so remote, fluctuating, and uncertain" that it gave her no basis
to challenge the statute. 184 Her interest was "a matter of public
concern and not of individual concern." 85 As such, she did not present
a case within the federal court's power under the Constitution's
framework of separated powers. 186 The Court explained:

The party who invokes the [federal judicial] power
must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid
but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some
87
indefinite way in common with people generally.1
The Court concluded that deciding a suit brought by a plaintiff
without a direct, personal injury "would be not to decide a judicial
controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the
governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an authority
which plainly we do not possess." 188
The Court relied on Frothingham in Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife. 8 9

Defenders

of Wildlife

challenged

a

federal

rule

90
interpreting the scope of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).1
Defenders sued under the ESA's "citizen suit" provision, which
authorized "any person" to sue the federal government for violations
of the ESA.191 The Court held that plaintiffs suing under the ESA's
citizen suit provision had to satisfy Article III's "concrete injury

requirement."1

92

standing"); id. § 3531.2, at 118 (stating that discussion of standing analysis in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife is "one of the most frequent-indeed almost obligatorycitations in standing decisions").
182. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 452. See generally Frothingham v. Mellon, 288 F.
252 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
183. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479.
184. Id. at 487.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 488.
187. Id.
188. Id.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574 (1992).
189.
190. Id. at 557-58.
191. Id. at 571-72.
192. Id. at 578.

102

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86.73

In so holding, the Court in Defenders of Wildlife cited
Frothinghamand other cases in which it had consistently held that a
plaintiff raising only a generally applicable grievance about
government--claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public
at large-does not state an Article III case or controversy. 193 The
Court relied on the separation of powers to explain the federal courts'
inability to hear generalized grievances by plaintiffs who cannot show
personal, concrete harm:
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the
invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury
requirement described in our cases, they would be
discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and
distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch-one of
the essential elements that identifies those "Cases"
and "Controversies" that are the business of the courts
rather than of the political branches. 194
Thus, as in Frothingham, the Court in Defenders of Wildlife
treated the suit before it as resting solely on an asserted violation of
public rights, and as such one that fell outside federal judicial power
under our system of separated powers.
Keep in mind that suits to vindicate public rights need not be suits
against the federal government, and not all suits against the federal
government seek to vindicate public rights. For example, an action
seeks to vindicate "public rights" when it is brought under a citizen
suit provision against a non-federal defendant for violations of a
public law like the Clean Water Act (CWA).195 To cite another example
that Justice Thomas took from common law, a suit against a private
defendant who created a public nuisance asserts public rights.196
Conversely, a suit against the federal executive branch will not always
involve public rights; it may instead involve "private rights."1 97 The

193.
Id. at 573-74.
194.
Id. at 576.
195.
E.g., LA. Cty. Flood Control Dist. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 568 U.S.
78, 81 (2013) (CWA suit against local flood control district and other defendants);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 176-77
(2000) (CWA suit against private corporation).
196.
Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
197.
Id. at 1551-52 (Thomas, J., concurring).

2018]

PATAGONIA VS. TRUMP

103

paradigm case is Marbury v. Madison, which involved Marbury's right
to a statutorily created office for a fixed term. 198
Suits for violations of private rights do not implicate the
separation of powers doctrine like suits for violations of public rights
do. Justice Thomas argued in Spokeo, "The separation-of-power
concerns underlying our public-rights decisions are not implicated
when private individuals sue to redress violations of their own private
rights."1 9 9 Similarly, Professor Andrew Hessick has argued that
"invoking separation of powers to restrict standing in private rights
200
If Justice
cases turns the separation of powers doctrine on its head."
Thomas and Professor Hessick are right, the Court's decisions
analyzing standing in private rights case shouldn't be applied to
public rights cases. And that brings us to Patagonia's suit against
Trump.
Patagonia's suit seeks to vindicate public rights. That is because
Patagonia argues that the president and other executive branch
officials have violated public laws-namely, the Antiquities Act, the
separation of powers doctrine, and the Take Care Clause-regulating
public lands. 20 1 Justice Thomas cites cases involving public lands as
an example of suits to vindicate "public rights." 202 That
characterization is supported by Court precedent in a different
context. 203 It is also supported by scholars. 204 Indeed, Patagonia

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the court is, solely, to
198.
decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion."); see Mary M. Cheh, When
Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done:An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive
Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce Them, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 263
(2003) ("Marbury was anchored in the world of private rights and the common law.");
cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the ConstitutionalMind: A BicentennialEssay
on the Wages of DoctrinalTension, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (stating that "Marbury
exhibits three distinct faces," only one of which is "[a] 'private-rights' face").
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1552 (Thomas, J., concurring).
199.
Hessick, supra 150, at 318.
200.
See supranote 43 and accompanying text.
201.
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1551-52 (Thomas, J., concurring).
202.
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (including among cases that
203.
involve public rights-and that can therefore be adjudicated by non-Article III
entities-cases between private parties and the government involving congressional
power over public lands); cf. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp.,
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372-78 n.3 (2018) (holding that non-Article III entity could,
under statutorily specified circumstances, reconsider and cancel previously issued
invention patent because the matter involved "public rights"; and discussing
relationship between invention patents and land patents).
204.
Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 157, at 704-07 (discussing 18th and 19th
century case law limiting ability of private parties in litigation to invoke rules that let
government take public ownership of land illegally owned by aliens and corporations);
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identified its suit as a public rights case in the message it put on its
website the day it filed suit. 2 0 5 When Patagonia announced online,
"The President Stole Your Land," it was speaking to the American
public about its public lands. 20 6 As a public rights case, Patagonia's
suit requires a different standing analysis from that for a private
rights suit.
As discussed above, the leading case on Patagonia's organizational
standing is Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.207 Yet Havens was a
private rights case. 208 Justice Thomas made this clear in his Spokeo
concurrence when he cited Havens as a suit "to vindicate a statutorily
created private right." 209 The Fair Housing Act created the private
right, which entitled the plaintiffs to accurate housing information. 2 10
Although Havens was a private rights case, the D.C. Circuit and other
courts have applied Havens to suits seeking to vindicate public
rights. 2 11
If the Court is serious about using history to inform standing law,
it should recognize the common law distinction between public rights
cases and private rights cases. 2 12 Also, in an appropriate case, the
Court should clarify that Havens was a private rights case, and the
Court's decision in Havens therefore should not be applied to public
rights cases.

2 13

see also Pfander, supra note 157, at 1521 (describing "actio popularis"- i.e., public
action-in which citizens sued a town's magistrates to challenge their decision to lease
public land, to vindicate public "right of pasturage" in the land).
205. Gelles, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
206. Gelles, supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also PatagoniaFiles Claim
Against Trump over Removing Bears Ears Protections, GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.comlenvironment/2017/dec/07/patagonia-files-claim-against
-trump-over-removing-bears-ears-protections (quoting Patagonia lawyer Robert
Tadlock: "This is about the issue of public lands."); Rose Marcario, PatagoniaCEO:
This Is Why
We're Suing President Trump, TIME (Dec. 6, 2017),
http://time.com/5052617/patagonia-ceo-suing-donald-trump/ (editorial by Patagonia
CEO stating that Trump's reduction of Bears Ears "robs the American people of their
public lands heritage").
207.
See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
208.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1553 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
209. Id.
210. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982).
211. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
212. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550-52 (Thomas, J., concurring).
213. The issue of what plaintiff-organizations should have to show to establish
organizational standing to assert public rights is beyond the scope of this Article;
however, if one adopts Justice Thomas's approach in his Spokeo concurrence, I would
argue that organizations, like individual plaintiffs, must show "some extraordinary
damage, beyond the rest of the community." Id. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *220). Furthermore, the
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IV. WHETHER PATAGONIA HAS THIRD-PARTY STANDING

Patagonia sues not only for itself but also for its employees and
sponsored athletes. 214 These workers, Patagonia alleges, visit "the
Bears Ears area . . . for various purposes, including ...

product

testing, marketing, professional training, fitness, education,
recreation, [and] spiritual and aesthetic enjoyment." 2 15 In asserting
standing for these workers, Patagonia will rely on cases in which the
Court has held that a plaintiff can sometimes assert the rights of third
parties with whom the plaintiff has a relationship. 2 16 Patagonia's suit
against Trump, however, does not meet the requirements for thirdparty standing.

requirement to show "extraordinary damage" should apply "with special force" in
cases, like Patagonia's, that seek "to require [executive officials] to 'follow the law."'
Id. at 1552 (Thomas, J., concurring). That requirement should not be satisfied by
allegations of injuries to generic activities in which anyone could engage, like making
recreational or aesthetic use of the public land affected by a defendant's challenged
conduct. Rather, by analogy to private suits for a public nuisance at common law, the
plaintiff should have to show injury that is different in nature, not just degree, from
that of the general public. See id.; see also Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179
U.S. 405, 406 (1900) ("[E]ven in a proceeding which he prosecutes for the benefit of the
public, as, for example, in cases of nuisance, [the plaintiff] must generally aver an
injury peculiar to himself, as distinguished from the great body of his fellow citizens.");
Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10, 27-28 (1850) (to the same effect); 2 H.G. WOOD,
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR VARIOUS FORMS;
INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY § 646, at 855 (3d ed. 1893)
("It is not enough that [the private plaintiff suing for a public nuisance] has sustained
more damage than another; it must be of a different character, special and apart from
that which the public in general sustain, and not such as is common to every person
who exercises the right that is injured."). See generally William B. Hale, Parties to
Actions, in 15 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE 473 (William M.
McKinney ed., Long Island, NY, Edward Thompson Co. 1899) (stating that "where a
public wrong results in special and peculiar damage to an individual, differing in kind
and not merely in degree from that suffered by the public at large, he may maintain
an action individually to protect his interests"). Although clothing companies like
Patagonia and individuals like their typical customers could not make the required
showing that I propose, the required showing could be made by Native American
Tribes and their members who claim to have long used an area like Bears Ears for
cultural and spiritual purposes. See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief ¶
74, 82, 96, 104, Hopi Tribe v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02590 (D.D.C. Dec. 4,2017) (generally
alleging "profound historic, cultural, and spiritual ties to Bears Ears" and detailing
those ties). To use Richard Re's concept, the Tribes and their members have a much
stronger claim of "relative standing" than Patagonia and its customers. See generally
Re, supra note 151.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, T 174, at 55-58.
214.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 46, at 17-18.
215.
216. E.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (citing
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004)).
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The Court has long held that "a party 'generally must assert his
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on
the legal rights and interests of third parties."' 2 17 This rule against
third-party standing "assumes that the party with the right has the
appropriate incentive to challenge (or not challenge) government
action and to do so with the necessary zeal and appropriate
presentation." 2 18 It also reflects concern that if people other than the
owner of the legal right asserts it, courts might have to "decide
abstract questions of wide public significance" that should be resolved
by the political branches.219
The rule against third-party standing has an exception, however,
when the party asserting a third party's rights not only can show
traceable injury in fact to himself, herself, or itself, but can also "make
two additional showings." 220 First, the plaintiff must have a "close
relationship" with the third party.22 1 Second, there must be "a
hindrance to the [third party's] ability to protect his[, her, or its] own
interests." 222

Patagonia stumbles at the start, because it cannot show injury in
fact to itself, as required for both organizational standing and thirdparty standing. 223 Patagonia also probably cannot meet the "close
relationship" and "hindrance" requirements for third-party standing.
The Court has not defined the term "close relationship" or applied
it consistently. 224 In most cases upholding third-party standing,
however, the relationship or potential relationship between the
plaintiff and the third party relates to-and is impaired or altogether
prevented by-the defendant's challenged conduct. For example, the
Court has let abortion providers challenge abortion restrictions by
asserting the rights of their actual or potential female patients. 225 The

217.
Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129.
218.
Id.
219.
Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510 (1975)).
220.
Id. at 130.
221. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1689 (quoting Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130).
222.
Id. (quoting Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130).
223.
See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
224.
Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 309
n.171 (1984) (stating that in determining what is a sufficient relationship for thirdparty standing, "the Court . . . proceed[s] on a largely intuitive basis"); see also
Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 134 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We have granted third-party
standing in a number of cases to litigants whose relationships with the directly
affected individuals were at best remote.").
225.
See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976) (plurality opinion); Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 188 (1973).
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Court has let white criminal defendants assert the rights of black
people excluded from their jury by discriminatory peremptory
challenges. 226 In a famous third-party standing case, the Court let the
owner of a bar assert the equal protection rights of her would-be male
customers who, unlike their female counterparts, were prevented by
the challenged Oklahoma law from drinking low-alcohol beer until
they were twenty-one years old. 22 7 In all these cases, the challenged
conduct adversely affected or blocked the existing or potential
relationship between the third party (actual or potential abortion
patient, excluded black juror, would-be bar patron) and the litigant
asserting the third party's rights (abortion provider, white criminal
defendant, and bar owner). 228
That is not true of the conduct challenged in Patagonia's suit
against Trump. Trump's reduction of Bears Ears does not hurt
Patagonia's relationship with its employees or sponsored athletes
with one possible exception: Patagonia alleges that its employees test
products and do marketing in the Bears Ears area. 2 2 9 It does not
allege, however, that reduction of Bear Ears will prevent its
employees from carrying out their testing or marketing duties. There
appears to be nothing about the Bears Ears area that makes it
uniquely suitable for those activities. Thus, Patagonia probably
cannot show the "close relationship" required for third-party
standing. 230

226.

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-15 (1991).

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976).
227.
See supra notes 225-27; see also, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257
228.
(1953) (upholding standing of white seller of property to assert equal protection rights
of black purchasers in suit against seller for breaching racially restrictive covenant;
stating that refusal to allow third-party standing could "result in a denial of
[purchasers] constitutional rights"); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.9.3, at
715 (calling Barrows "one of the most famous decisions on invoking the rights of

others").
229. UDB Compl., supra note 1, [ 46, at 17-18.
230. The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the third-party standing of an
employer to assert the rights of employees. Lower federal courts have done so,
however, with mixed results. The Ninth Circuit upheld an employer's third-party
standing in Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit
held that an "adult cabaret" owner could-in his challenge to an ordinance regulating
adult cabarets-assert the rights of adult-cabaret managers and entertainers. Id. at
1010. The court observed that the ordinance's stringent requirements for managers
and entertainers could cause those potential employees of the plaintiff-owner to
"choose to engage in their professions in other cities," and that, without managers and
entertainers, the plaintiff-owner could not do business. Id. Thus, the ordinance
impaired the relationship between the plaintiff-owner and existing or potential
managers and entertainers. Those circumstances, together with the First Amendment
context, justified third-party standing. See also White's Place, Inc. v. Glover, 222 F.3d
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Patagonia also probably cannot show that a "hindrance" prevents
its employees and sponsored athletes from asserting their own rights.
The hindrance, such as it is, presumably consists simply of a lack of
money and willingness by those third parties to sue Trump
themselves. Their lack of means and motivation is not comparable to
the "hindrances" that the Court has found sufficient to justify thirdparty standing. 23 1 Moreover, treating a lack of means and motivation

1327, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying associational standing to an employer seeking to
assert its employees' rights; but agreeing with the Fifth Circuit that "a business may
assert the First Amendment rights of its employees where 'violation of those rights
adversely affects the financial interests or patronage of the business"' (quoting Hang
On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1995)); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 574 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1980) (holding that company
had third-party standing to assert employees' privacy rights in challenge to
administrative subpoena directed to company requiring it to turn over employee
records; noting that employer-employee relationship is "ordinarily" not as intimate as
doctor-patient relationship that has supported third-party standing in U.S. Supreme
Court precedent); cf. UAW v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 559 n.13 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that employer lacked third-party standing because employees could assert
their own rights); Jonida Trucking, Inc. v. Hunt, 124 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that employer lacked third-party standing to assert employee's rights because
employer's interests did not necessarily align with employees' interests); Viceroy Gold
Corp. v. Aubry, 75 F.3d 482, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that employer lacked
third-party standing to assert employees' rights because they could assert their own
rights); MD II Entm't, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 28 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 1994) (same);
O'Hare v. Gen. Marine Transp. Corp., 740 F.2d 160, 172 (2nd Cir. 1984) (same).
231.
Cf. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (upholding
standing to assert rights of third party who was dead); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,
711-12, 723 n.7 (1987) (same); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972)
(upholding contraceptive distributor's standing to assert rights of potential customers
because, under challenged statutory scheme restricting distribution, contraceptive
users were "denied a forum in which to assert their own rights"); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (holding that NAACP could assert its
members' right to withhold from the State the fact that they were members of the
NAACP; reasoning that, "[t]o require that it be claimed by the members themselves
would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion"); Barrows,
346 U.S. at 257 (upholding third-party standing of white seller of property to challenge
racially restrictive covenant when "it would be difficult if not impossible for the
persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court"); cf.
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1998); id. at 448 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (court upheld third-party standing of daughter to assert father's equal
protection rights where father sued for himself but had his claim incorrectly dismissed
by lower court for lack of standing); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (letting abortion provider assert female patients' rights because
patients might refrain from suing to protect their privacy, despite option of suing
pseudonymously, and because individual claims might become moot, despite mootness
exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review); id. at 121-22 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part) (not joining in plurality's third-party standing analysis but
concluding that abortion providers could assert their own constitutional rights); id. at
126 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that obstacles
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as a "hindrance" conflicts with a central purpose of the rule against
third-party standing-respecting the choice of rights holders not to
assert those rights. 2 32 That choice will often be based on the rights
holder's determination of whether it is worth it to sue. Thus, it would
not be unusual if Patagonia's employees and sponsored athletes
determined that it is not worth their time and money to sue Trump.
That determination therefore cannot confer third-party standing upon
Patagonia. 233
V. WHETHER PATAGONIA HAS ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING UNDER
CURRENT LAW

A. Patagonia'sAllegations of AssociationalStanding
Patagonia alleges "direct and immediate injury" not only to itself
234
The employees
but also to its "employees" and "sponsored athletes."
Bears Ears for
use
they
because
harm
suffer
assertedly
and athletes
by Trump's
impaired
be
will
uses
various purposes, and those
235
Patagonia refers to their employees
reduction of the monument.
and sponsored athletes as "affiliates." 236 Case law, however, uses the
term "constituents" when a non-membership organization like
237
This
Patagonia seeks to sue for people who are not its members.
Article will likewise use the term "constituents," and turns, in the next
section, to discussing the law on whether Patagonia can sue for its
constituents.

that plurality perceived to third parties' assertion of their own rights were
"chimerical").
E.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161-66 (1990); Duke Power Co.
232.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); Wulff, 428 U.S. at 113-14.
Viceroy Gold Corp., 75 F.3d at 489 ("A simple lack of motivation does not
233.
constitute a [hindrance] to asserting [one's own] interest."); cf. Lea Brilmayer, The
Jurisprudenceof Article III: Perspectives on the "Caseor Controversy"Requirement, 93
HARV. L. REV. 297, 310 (1979) (discussing "the self-determination perspective" as basis
for an argument that "persons should not be able to assert the rights of others even
assuming they are good representatives").
UDB Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 174, at 55-58.
234.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 46, at 17-18; id. ¶ 174, at 55-58.
235.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 1, at 1.
236.
E.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342 (1977).
237.
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B. CurrentLaw ofAssociational Standing
In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, the
Court established a three-part test for when an association can sue as
a representative of its members:
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of
its members when: (a) its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 2 3 8

Although the test seems to assume that the plaintiff-association
has members, the Court made clear that this is not necessary. 239
Indeed, the Court in Hunt applied this test to uphold the standing of
an organization that lacked members. 240
The plaintiff in Hunt was a state agency, the Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission.241 The Commission was created by
statute to promote the Washington apple industry by advertising,
research, and public education. 242 It was headed by Washington apple
growers and dealers who were elected by their fellow growers and
dealers.24 3 Its activities were financed entirely by mandatory
assessments on the apple industry. 244 The assessments were based on
the volume of apples grown and packaged as Washington apples. 2 45
The Commission challenged a North Carolina law, claiming that
it violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 24 6 The challenged law
prohibited containers of apples sold in North Carolina from bearing
any grade except the USDA grade. 247 It thereby prevented containers
of Washington apples shipped there from displaying the unique grade
that Washington State had devised to distinguish its apples for their
quality. 248 The Court held, in an opinion for the Court by Chief Justice
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 343.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 336-37.
Id.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 341-45.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 336-39.
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Burger, that the Commission had associational standing to challenge
the North Carolina law on behalf of Washington apple growers and
dealers. 249 That was so even though the growers and dealers were not
members of the Commission-indeed, the Commission had no
members-as seemingly required by the three-part test for
associational standing that the Court articulated for the first time in
Hunt.2 5 0 The Court gave three reasons why the Commission, though
not a membership entity, had associational standing.
First, the Commission "for all practical purposes performled] the
functions of a traditional trade association representing the
Washington apple industry."251 Its purpose was to serve a "specialized
segment" of the economy-apple growers and dealers-who were "the
primary beneficiary of its activities." 252 Under those circumstances,
the Court thought that "it would exalt form over substance to
differentiate between the Washington Commission and a traditional
trade association representing the individual growers and dealers
who collectively form its constituency." 253
Besides the Commission's close resemblance to a "voluntary
membership organization," 254 the Court in Hunt relied on its
determination that the growers and dealers "possess[ed] all of the
indicia of membership in an organization." 255 The Court explained,
"They alone elect the members of the Commission; they alone may
serve on the Commission; [and] they alone finance its activities,
including the costs of this lawsuit, through assessments levied upon
them." 256 Because of the control that growers and dealers had over the
Commission, the Court concluded, "In a very real sense, . .. the
Commission represents the . . . means by which they express their
257
In other
collective views and protect their collective interests."

Id. at 341-46.
249.
Id. at 342.
250.
Id. at 344.
251.
252.
Id.
Id. at 345.
253.
Id. at 342.
254.
Id. at 344.
255.
256.
Id. at 344-45.
UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 297 n.* (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting
257.
that, unlike Court's organizational standing doctrine, in class actions "there must be
an identity of interests among all plaintiffs before the court-an identity that can be
counted upon to assure adequate representation."); cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (holding that NAACP could assert its members'
rights because its interests were identical to its members, and so it was "but the
medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their own views").
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words, there was an "identity of interests" between the Commission
and its constituents. 258
The third circumstance that the Court relied upon in Hunt was
the connection between the economic interests of the Commission and
those of the growers and dealers. The Court observed that "the
interests of the Commission itself may be adversely affected by the
outcome of this litigation." 259 The adverse economic impact on the
Commission arose because the assessments paid to the Commission
were tied to the volume of Washington apples sold.26 0 If the North
Carolina law decreased that volume, it could "reduce the amount of
the assessments due the Commission."261 The Court concluded that
"[t]his financial nexus between the interests of the Commission and
its constituents" helped ensure the "concrete adverseness" required by
Article

111.262

In sum, the Court treated the Commission like the paradigmatic
"voluntary
membership
association"-a
"traditional
trade
258.
Health Research Grp. v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21, 26 (D.D.C. 1979) (Sirica, J.)
(emphasis omitted) ("[D]espite the anomaly that the Commission [in Hunt] was a
State-created, non-membership organization, it was totally a creature of the parties it
purported to represent.").
259.
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345.
260.
Id.
261.
Id.
262.
Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). The Court in Hunt did

not address whether the "financial nexus" discussed in the text accompanying this
note enabled the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission to show that the
Commission itself had injury in fact. Cf. id. at 342 (quoting, but not addressing,
defendants' argument that Commission "has suffered no 'distinct and palpable injury'
to itself'). The Court apparently regarded that issue as unnecessary to decide because
it had said in an earlier case, and repeated in Hunt, "Even in the absence of injury to
itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members."
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 342 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)). When
questioned at oral argument, counsel for the Commission in Hunt said that, while
there was no evidence that the challenged North Carolina statute had already lowered
its income from assessments on the apple industry, "that income could easily be
affected by this kind of restriction." Transcript of Oral Argument, Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (No. 76-63), https://www.oyez.org/
cases/1976/76-63. In any event, the "financial nexus" present in Hunt tied the case to
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court in Pattersonheld
that the NAACP had standing to assert its members' right not to have their identity
as members disclosed to Alabama officials. Id. at 458-60. The Court determined that
the NAACP's "nexus with them is sufficient to permit that it act as their representative
before this Court." Id. at 458-59. One component of that nexus was the financial
connection between the members' rights and the organization's fortunes. The Court
explained, "The reasonable likelihood that the Association itself through diminished
financial support and membership may be adversely affected if production is compelled
is a further factor pointing towards our holding that petitioner has standing to
complain of the production order on behalf of its members." Id. at 459--60.
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association"-because it acted just like one and its constituents acted
just like members of such an association. 263 Plus, there was a
"financial nexus" between the Commission and the constituents upon
whom its standing rested. 264
C. Application of Current Law to Patagonia'sAllegations of
AssociationalStanding
Patagonia's suit against Trump does not present the
circumstances that the Court relied on in Hunt to allow a nonmembership organization to assert associational standing. And
Patagonia's lack of associational standing is confirmed by lower court
case law applying Hunt to non-membership organizations.
First, unlike a traditional trade association, Patagonia does not
exist to represent the interests of the constituents on whose behalf it
sues: its employees and sponsored athletes. Patagonia's mission
statement, according to its articles of incorporation, is to "[b]uild the
best product, cause no unnecessary harm, [and] use business to
inspire and implement solutions to the environmental crisis."265

263. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344. The Court in Hunt repeatedly implies that the
paradigmatic voluntary membership association is a "traditional trade association."
Id.; see id. at 342 ("[The Commission is not a traditional voluntary membership
organization such as a trade association."); id. ("If the Commission were a voluntary
membership organization-a typical trade association-its standing to bring this
action as the representative of its constituents would be clear under prior decisions of
this Court."); id. at 344 ("The Commission, while admittedly a state agency, for all
practical purposes performs the functions of a traditional trade association
representing the Washington apple industry."); id. at 345 ("Under the circumstances
presented here, it would exalt form over substance to differentiate between the

Washington Commission and a traditional trade association representing the
individual growers and dealers who collectively form its constituency."). The Court's
repeated comparison of the Commission to a traditional trade association in Hunt tied
the case before it to National Motor Freight Traffic Association v. United States, 372
U.S. 246 (1963) (per curiam), a case that the Hunt Court cited in its standing analysis.
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. The Court in NationalMotor Freight Traffic Association upheld
the standing of trade associations to challenge an ICC order that adversely affected
their member motor carriers. 372 U.S. at 247. Indeed, the Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission closely resembled the trade associations in NationalMotor
FreightTraffic Association, in that both the Commission and those trade associations
were ultimately creatures of a statute that created them precisely to represent the
constituents on whom they based their standing. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344; Nat'l
Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n, 372 U.S. at 246; see also infra notes 317-29 (discussing
NationalMotor Freight Traffic Association).
264. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345.
265. Restated Articles of Incorporation of Patagonia Works § II.C, at 2 (2013),
https://businesssearch.sos.ca.gov/CBS/SearchResults?SearchType=CORP&SearchCri
teria-patagonia+works&SearchSubType=Keyword.
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Patagonia's list of "responsibilities" as a holding company, like its
mission statement, does not mention employees or sponsored
athletes. 266 As a "California benefit corporation," 267 it lists among its
"public benefit purposes" the purpose of "provid[ing] a supportive
work environment." 2 68 But Patagonia does not claim that its purpose
is to represent its employees' or sponsored athletes' interests. In no
way are those individuals "the primary beneficiary of [Patagonia's]
activities" except insofar as the company pays them. 26 9 In that respect,
of course, every employee or independent contractor is a beneficiary
of his or her boss.
Moreover, Patagonia's employees and sponsored athletes do not
possess all of the indicia of membership in an organization." 2 70
Patagonia does not allege, for instance, that these individuals elect its
leadership or fund its activities. 271 On the contrary, Patagonia selects
and pays its leadership. Patagonia is apparently a nice place to
work. 2 7 2 But its employees and sponsored athletes do not exert so
much control over it that it serves as "the means by which they
express their collective views and protect their collective interests." 273
Finally, there is no "financial nexus" between Patagonia's
interests and its constituents like the one in Hunt.274 The law
challenged in Hunt increased the costs of doing business in North
Carolina for Washington apple growers and dealers. 2 75 The Court
determined that those increased costs could decrease the overall
volume of Washington apples sold, which could in turn decrease the
amount of assessments that the growers and dealers paid to the
Commission.276 No similar economic harm could arise from Trump's

266.
See FAQ, PATAGONIA WORKS http://www.patagoniaworks.com/faq/ (last
visited Jan. 7, 2019).
267.
UDB Compl., supra note 1, T 43, at 16.
268.
Restated Articles of Incorporation of Patagonia Works § II.D.6, at 3 (2013),
https://businesssearch.sos.ca.gov/CBS/SearchResults?SearchType=CORP&SearchCri
teria-patagonia+works&SearchSubType=Keyword.
269.
See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344.
270.
Id.
271.
Cf. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6(b) (2018) (bill
introduced by Sen. Elizabeth Warren containing provision that would require at least
40% of directors of a large corporation to be elected by its employees).
272.
A New York Times article describes Patagonia as "a corporate Eden of sorts,"
with "solar panels and picnic tables in the parking lot, day care with a jungle gym by
the main lobby and easy access to the beach, where employees surf during lunch
break." Gelles, supra note 2.
273.
See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345.
274.
See id.
275. Id. at 347.
276. Id. at 345.
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reduction of Bears Ears. Trump's action cannot conceivably hurt
Patagonia's profits or those of its employees. 277 Thus, Patagonia's suit
does not present the same sort of "financial nexus" that was present,
and supported associational standing, in Hunt.278
In short, Patagonia is nothing like a traditional trade association
and its employees and sponsored athletes are nothing like members
of such an association. Nor does Patagonia's lawsuit against Trump
implicate Patagonia's and its constituents' shared financial fortunes.
At bottom, though distinctive "at the margins," Patagonia is much like
any other for-profit entity. 279 As such, Patagonia lacks standing to sue
for its constituents.
This conclusion finds support in lower court case law rejecting
assertions of associational standing by non-membership entities. For
example, the D.C. Circuit held that High Times magazine lacked
associational standing to sue the Drug Enforcement Administration
on behalf of its readers. 280 The court said it didn't matter that High
28 1
Times shared its readers' interest in decriminalizing marijuana.
What mattered was that the readers had no role "in selecting [High
Times'] leadership, guiding its activities, or financing those
activities." 282 Like for-profit organizations, non-profit organizations
without members are regularly denied associational standing by
lower courts. For example, the D.C. Circuit denied standing to the

In fact, Patagonia's lawsuit against Trump seems likely to have boosted the
277.
company's bottom line. See Cam Wolf, Patagonia's Anti-Trump Statement Was
Massively Good for Business, GQ (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.gq.com/story/patagoniatrump-lawsuit-sales-uptick (reporting that on the day after Patagonia filed its lawsuit
and issued a press release about it, Patagonia's online sales were six times higher than
usual, and remained elevated for the rest of the week); see also Elise Herron, Patagonia
CEO Says Her Conflict With 'Despot" President Trump Was Great for Business,
WILLAMETTE WK. (Apr. 6, 2018), http://www.wweek.com/technology/2018/04/06/
patagonia-ceo-says-her-conflict-with-despot-president-trump-was-great-for-business/
(quoting Patagonia CEO, Rose Marcario, as stating that its lawsuit against Trump
"has been great for business" and that the company was "going to have the best year
ever").
See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 345.
278.
CHOUINARD & STANLEY, supra note 2, at 5 ("Patagonia, if exceptional at all,
279.
is so only at the margins.").
Gettman v. DEA, 290 F.3d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
280.
281.
Id.
Id.; see also Fleck & Assocs. v. City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir.
282.
2006) (holding that gay social club, a for-profit entity, lacked associational standing to
sue for its customers in challenge to ordinance banning live sex acts at commercial
establishments); Fund Democracy, LLC v. SEC, 278 F.3d 21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(denying associational standing to a "one-person business" that claimed to "represent [
an 'informal consortium' of various groups whose members are individual mutual fund
investors and are threatened with injury by the [challenged] SEC order").
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American Legal Foundation (ALF), a "nonprofit media law center
which work[ed] to promote media fairness and accountability."2 83 ALF
sued the FCC on behalf of its "supporters" for failing to take action
against assertedly distorted news broadcasts. 284 The court explained
that ALF "bears none of the indicia of a traditional membership
organization discussed in Hunt."285 This lower court case law correctly
reflects that, under Hunt, it will be rare for a non-membership
association to have associational standing. 286
VI. THE COURT SHOULD REVISIT AND REPUDIATE THE HUNT TEST FOR
ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING.

This Part of the Article argues that the Court should abandon the
three-part Hunt test for associational standing. The Hunt test is
anomalous and lacks precedential support. Moreover, the test does
not ensure that plaintiff-organizations adequately represent the
members or other constituents whose rights they seek to assert.
Instead of using the Hunt test, federal courts should require the
plaintiff-organization in each case to show it will adequately represent
the constituents whose rights it seeks to assert. To simplify that
showing, the Court should adopt a rebuttable presumption of
adequacy when a plaintiff-organization can show it bears the "indicia
of a [traditional] membership" organization identified in Hunt.28 7

283.

Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 87-91 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

284.

Id.

285.
Id. at 90; see also, e.g., Pac. Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982, 993-94
(D. Mont. 1981) (holding that Pacific Legal Foundation did not have associational

standing to represent its non-member "supporters"); Health Research Grp. v.
Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that contributors and supporters of
two non-profit groups "have neither the indicia of membership nor any other
connection with [those groups] sufficiently substantial to confer associational standing
on either [group]"); cf. Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1105, 1111 (9th Cir.
2003) (plaintiff-organization was a "federally authorized and funded law office
established under the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986
('PAMII'), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851"; court held that it could sue for its
"constituents"-i.e., "mentally incapacitated" criminal defendants-even though they
were not formal members; court admitted that organization's constituents "[did] not
have all the indicia of membership that the Hunt apple growers and dealers
possessed.").
286. See Hope, Inc. v. Cty. of DuPage, 738 F.2d 797, 814 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The
Supreme Court has not seen fit to extend representational capacity standing to entities
other than associations which actually represent interests of parties whose affiliation
with the representational litigant is that of membership with the representative or
substantial equivalent of membership.").
287. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1977).

PATAGONIA VS. TRUMP

2018]

117

A. The Hunt Test for AssociationalStanding Is Anomalous.
The Hunt test for associational standing is neither fish nor fowl.
It differs from third-party standing and similar doctrines, because it
does not require the plaintiff to show injury in fact. Nor can it be
justified as a form of purely representative standing, because it does
not ensure adequate representation of those represented.
Hunt prescribes requirements for an association to sue for its
members or other constituents "[e]ven in the absence of injury to
itself."m By not requiring the plaintiff-organization to show injury to
itself, the Hunt test differs from three other situations in which a
party can assert the rights of others:
*
*

*

In third-party standing cases, the plaintiff must
show injury in fact to itself.289
In cases where a party challenges a statute as
overbroad-i.e., invalid as applied to third parties
not before the court-the party invariably faces
injury to itself.290
In a class action, the plaintiffs representing the
class must show injury in fact to themselves. 291

288. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
289. E.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972) ("[T]his Court
has held that in exceptional situations a concededly injured party may rely on the
constitutional rights of a third party in obtaining relief.") (emphasis added) (citing
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953)); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943)
(holding that doctor lacked standing to assert patients' rights because challenged
statute did not violate his own rights); see also Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392,
397 (1998) (stating that when a criminal defendant asserts the rights of third parties,
the defendant must show that the challenged action causes the defendant injury in
fact); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1359 (2000) (stating that "third-party standing" is
most often used "to refer to the claims of a constitutional challenger who asserts that
'a single application of a law both injures him and (thereby] impinges upon the
constitutional rights of [identifiable] third persons"') (quoting Note, Standingto Assert
ConstitutionalJus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 424 (1974)).
290. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.9.4, at 807 (stating that, because
of the injury in fact requirement, "[o]verbreadth standing may be denied if a plaintiff
seeks to challenge a statute that does not apply to the plaintiff'); see also Sabri v.
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) ("[O]verbreadth challenges call for relaxing
familiar requirements of standing, to allow a determination that the law would be

unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from those
at hand.").
291. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 n.6 (2016) ("[Nlamed plaintiffs
who represent a class 'must allege and show that they personally have been injured,
not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which
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By excusing the plaintiff-organization from showing personal
injury in fact, the Hunt test omits the predicate for the exercise of
federal judicial power. 292
This feature makes the Hunt test one that lets the plaintifforganization sue in a purely representative capacity. The plaintifforganization serves a role like that of a guardian suing for a minor or
incompetent person, or an executor or administrator suing for an
estate. But a guardian needs to be appointed by someone else,
typically a family member or a court. 293 The same is true of executors
and administrators. 2 94 In contrast, associations allowed to sue under
the Hunt test are self-appointed representatives.
One might reply that associations are not self-appointed but are,
instead, "appointed" to represent their members when the members
join. 295 But that reply ignores that people join associations for many
different reasons, sometimes just to get discounts. 296 More
fundamentally, the Hunt test does not require a court to determine
whether implied (or constructive) appointment authorizes the
particular plaintiff-organization's suit. Indeed, the Court recognized
as much in UAW v. Brock.297 The Court did not "dismiss out of hand
the ... concern that associations allowed to proceed under Hunt will

they belong"' and which they purport to represent. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights, 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976))); see also Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125-26
(1991) (interpreting a federal statute to require a plaintiff in shareholder derivative
suit to "maintain some continuing financial stake in the litigation," to avoid "serious
constitutional doubt" whether Article III would allow otherwise).
292.
E.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018); see also Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
293.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-201 (amended 2010) (addressing the appointment
of a guardian for a minor); id. § 5-301 (addressing the appointment of a guardian for
an incapacitated person by will or other writing).
294.
E.g., id. §§ 3-203(a)(1), 3-307(a), 3-314.
295.
Cf. UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) ("[The doctrine of associational
standing recognizes that the primary reason people join an organization is often to
create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others.").
296.
See Jason Mazzone, Freedom'sAssociations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 688-95
(2002) (discussing wide variety of organizations and observing that some, such as AAA,
"exist solely for the tangible benefits they provide to their members"). To cite another
example, AARP is the largest membership organization in the United States. The 5
Biggest Associations, BISNOW (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.bisnow.com/archives/
newsletter/association/4756-the-5-biggest-associations. In this author's experience,
many people join AARP to get the discounts that it offers. That experience accords
with its website, which emphasizes this aspect of membership. AARP,
https://www.aarp.org/benefits-discounts/Vintemp=DSO-HDR-BENEFITS-EWHERE
(last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
297.
477 U.S. at 290.
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not always be able to represent adequately the interests of all their
injured members." 29 8 The Court could hardly do otherwise, since
application of the Hunt test does not require a case-by-case
assessment of a plaintiff-association's adequacy as a representative of
its members. 299
Furthermore, the requirements for associational standing that the
Hunt test imposes are too lax to reliably ensure adequate
representation.30 0 The test's first requirement-a showing that one or
more members would have standing in their own right-can be
satisfied as long as a single member of the organization can show
standing.30 1 The Hunt test's second requirement-that the lawsuit be
"germane to the organization's" interest-"is often found without
difficulty," for it is quite undemanding, at least as understood by the
lower courts. 302 For example, the D.C. Circuit has held that
"[g]ermaneness is satisfied by a 'mere pertinence' between litigation
subject and an organization's purpose."30 3 An association can usually
meet the third requirement of the Hunt test-i.e., showing that the
participation of individual members as parties is not requiredsimply by seeking declaratory or injunctive relief instead of
damageS. 30 4
As Justice Powell explained in his dissent in UAW v. Brock, "the
concept of [associational] representation is based on a theoretical
30 5
Yet that
identity between the organization and its members."

298. Id.
See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977)
299.
("[I[t would exalt form over substance to differentiate between the ... Commission and
a traditional trade association representing the individual[s] . . . who collectively form
its constituency.").
Donald F. Simone, Note, Associational Standingand Due Process: The Need
300.
for an Adequate RepresentationScrutiny, 61 B.U. L. REV. 174, 184 (1981) ("The limited
fails to meet the due
adequate representation scrutiny provided by the Hunt test ...
process standards. It does not protect against the possibility of internal conflicts
among members. Nor does it guarantee that the association and its membership share
the same litigation goals.").
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) ("The association must allege
301.
that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury.")
(emphasis added); id. at 515 ("[T]he association must show that . .. one or more of its
members are injured.") (emphasis added); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, §
3531.9.5, at 879 ("[1It appears to be accepted that an organization plaintiff need show
injury to only a single member.").
302. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.9.5, at 900.
Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat'1 Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d
303.
107, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Humane Soc. of the U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 58
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.9.5, at 928.
304.
UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 297 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
305.
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identity of interests is not ensured by the Hunt test. The Hunt test
permits a suit that furthers the interests of a "quite small" numberindeed, one-of an association's members or other constituents.3 06 The
association "may therefore lack the incentive to provide the adequate
representation needed by the court." 30 7 In addition, the association

"may have reasons for instituting a suit-such as the publicity that
attends a major case-other than to assert rights of its members."3 0 8
The Hunt test differs from "the typical class action," Justice Powell
explained, in which "there must be an identity of interests among all
plaintiffs before the court-an identity that can be counted upon to
assure adequate representation." 309 Satisfaction of the Hunt test does
not assure adequate representation and therefore cannot justify a
plaintiffs suing in a purely representative capacity.
In short, the Hunt test falls between the stools of cases in which a
litigant possessing injury in fact is allowed to assert the rights of
others and cases in which a plaintiff lacking injury in fact sues in a
purely representative capacity. When a plaintiff has neither a
concrete stake in the case nor a commitment solely to advance the
interests of someone who does, that plaintiff does not belong in federal
court. 310

B. The Hunt Test Lacks PrecedentialSupport.
The notion that an association that lacks injury can "borrow" its
members' standing first arose in Sierra Club v. Morton.3 11 There, the
Court said, "It is clear that an organization whose members are
injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial
review." 3 12 This statement was dicta, because the Sierra Club did not
seek to represent its injured members. 313 The Court nonetheless
repeated the principle three years later in Warth v. Seldin, stating,
"Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have

306.
See id. at 296. (Powell, J., dissenting).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 297. (Powell, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 296 n.* (Powell, J., dissenting).
310. See Brilmayer, supra note 233, at 309 ("[here are reasons to doubt whether
self-appointed ideological plaintiffs should be presumed to be adequate
representatives.").
311. See WRIGHT & MLLER, supra note 10, § 3531.9.5, at 875 (stating that Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), "established the proposition that if members are
injured, an organization that has not been injured" may have representational
standing; and describing this situation as one involving "borrowed member standing").
312. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739.
313. Id. at 730, 735.
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314
This
standing solely as the representative of its members."
statement, like the similar one in Sierra Club, was dicta, because the
Court held in Warth v. Seldin that the plaintiff-organizations'
members lacked standing in their own right.3 15 The Court turned the
dicta into a holding for the first time in 1977, when in Hunt it
articulated the modern three-part test for associational standing and
upheld the plaintiffs standing to sue on behalf of its constituents
without having determined that the plaintiff itself suffered injury in
fact traceable to the defendants. 3 16
This author's research has uncovered only one case before Hunt in
which the Court expressly upheld an association's standing to sue for
its members without showing injury to itself: NationalMotor Freight
Traffic Association v. United States.31 7 Indeed, NationalMotor Freight
Traffic Association is the only case that the Court cited when it said
in Warth v. Seldin that "[e]ven in the absence of injury to itself, an
association may have standing solely as the representative of its
members."3 18 National Motor Freight Traffic Association, however,
furnishes flimsy support for the Hunt test for associational standing.
In National Motor Freight Traffic Association, a three-judge
district court dismissed a suit by associations of motor carriers
challenging a decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC).3 19 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed the
320
Later, the
district court's dismissal of the trade associations' suit.
per
a
one-paragraph
issued
but
rehearing
for
Court denied a petition
321
In
affirmance.
curiam opinion clarifying the basis of its summary
that later opinion, the Court observed that the district court had
322
The
dismissed the suit for both lack of standing and lack of merit.
Court said it agreed that the suit lacked merit but disagreed with the
district court's ruling that the trade associations lacked standing to

422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
314.
315. Id. at 512-17.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
316.
See 372 U.S. 246, 247 (1963) (per curiam).
317.
Warth, 422 U.S. at 511; see also UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 281 (1986)
318.
(citing only National Motor Freight Traffic Association, Sierra Club, and Warth to
support its statement that an association's standing to sue for its members, "[e]ven in
the absence of injury to itself," had "long been settled").
205 F. Supp. 592, 597 (D.D.C. 1962), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 223 (1962), on
319.
rehearing, 372 U.S. 246 (1963) (per curiam).
Natl Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 371 U.S. 223, 223 (1962)
320.
(per curiam), on rehearing, 372 U.S. 246 (1963) (per curiam).
Natl Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246, 246 (1963)
321.
(per curiam).
322. Id. at 247.
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bring the suit.323 The Court explained that the associations existed
because of agreements approved by the ICC under a federal statute. 324
They also "perform[ed] significant functions in the administration of
the Interstate Commerce Act, including the representation of member
carriers in proceedings before the Commission." 325 For those reasons,
the associations "[were] proper representatives of the interests of their
members." 326 The Court did not discuss whether the associations
could show injury to themselves.
NationalMotor FreightTraffic Association thus involved plaintiffassociations that had been authorized to represent their members by
statute, ICC order, and administrative practice. 327 Those distinctive
factors, relied upon by the Court in an opinion issued without plenary
consideration, cause the per curiam opinion to be a weak foundation
for the Hunt test. 3 2 8

323.
Id.
324.
Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1958)).
325.
Id.
326.
Id.
327.
See R.I. Truck Owners Ass'n v. Smith, No. 74-1641, 1975 WL 170014, at *23 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1975) (discussing NationalMotor Freight Traffic Association
and stating, "It is evident that associations of motor carriers have a special status
under the Interstate Commerce Act and that because of the large volume of work
entertained by the I.C.C., it must allow those associations to act in a representative
capacity."); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1)(G) (authorizing a party to sue without joining
the person for whose benefit the suit is brought when the party is "authorized by
statute" to do so).
328.
In its motion to affirm the three-judge district court's ruling, the ICC devoted
less than two pages to the standing issue. United States' Motion to Affirm at 6-7, Nat'l
Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963) (No. 479). The ICC
presumably did not want to give the standing issue a high profile because it
"recognize[d] that this precise issue ha[d] not been [previously] decided by th[e] Court."
Id. at 7. Consistent with a strategy of downplaying the novel standing issue, the ICC
spent most of its submission defending the three-judge panel's decision on the merits.
Id. at 7-11. The other appellees did not address the standing issue at all in their
motion to affirm. Motion of Appellee Freight Forwarders to Affirm at 3-4, Nat'l Motor
Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963) (No. 479). In opposing the
motions to affirm, the National Motor Freight Traffic Association and other appellants
cited only one U.S. Supreme Court decision in support of their claim of associational
standing: NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,357 U.S. 449 (1958). Brief for Appellant
at 2, 3, 5, Nat'l Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963) (No.
479). As discussed infra notes 334-47, however, in Patterson the plaintiff-association,
the NAACP, plainly suffered injury in fact traceable to the challenged conduct as to
which it sought to assert its members' rights. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 458-59.
Accordingly, when the National Motor Freight Traffic Association and the other
appellants petitioned for rehearing or, in the alternative, for clarification of the Court's
order of summary affirmance, they emphasized the novelty of the issue whether an
association of carriers could seek review of ICC orders. Petition for Rehearing or for
Clarification of Order at 2, Nat'l Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S.
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National Motor Freight Traffic Association seems to stand alone
in expressly allowing an organization that lacked injury to itself to
"borrow" its members' standing. 329 In other cases before Sierra Club
where the Court expressly upheld the standing of associations to sue
330
for their members, the association itself could show injury in fact.

The leading cases involved the NAACP: NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson331 and NAACP v. Button.332 These NAACP cases not only
involved plaintiffs with injury in fact but also had other features that
aligned them with other cases involving third-party standing, as
distinguished from associational standing.333
Patterson, in particular, was seminal. 334 There, the Alabama
Attorney General sued the NAACP in state court to shut down the
NAACP's operations in Alabama on the ground that those operations
violated state law.33 5 To get evidence of the alleged violation, the

Attorney General got a court order requiring the NAACP to produce
the names and addresses of its members.3 3 6 The NAACP refused to

246 (1963) (No. 479). They said that the standing issue was one that "to the best of
[their] knowledge, has never been considered by any federal court except the District
Court in this case." Id. Considering the limited briefing on, and the novelty of, the
standing issue in National Motor Freight Traffic Association, the Court's short per

curiam opinion-which, recall, does not even address whether the plaintiff trade
associations could show injury to themselves or the significance of that issuewarrants the narrowest possible reading. Nat'l Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n, 372 U.S.
246 (1963). Instead, the Court in Warth relied on that decision alone for the broad
proposition, "Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing
solely as the representative of its members." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
329. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 3531.9.5, at 875 (using the term
"borrowed member standing").
330. See William Burnham, Aspirational and Existential Interests of Social
Reform Organizations:A New Role for the Ideological Plaintiff, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 153, 163 n.45 (1985) (stating that associational standing under Court's modern
case law appears to be "the only situation in which the titular litigant may litigate
without any injury to itself."); Note, Standing to Assert ConstitutionalJus Tertii, 88
HARV. L. REV. 423, 429-30 (1974) (article pre-dating Hunt stating that "the Court
appears never to have heard a case in which a litigant's only assertion of harm was
that the challenged action deprived third parties of their constitutional rights").
331. 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958).
332. 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).
333. Cf. Marc Rohr, Fightingfor the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of ThirdParty Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 430
(1981) (observing that the Court treated the Patterson case, which author cites as
"NAACP v. Alabama," as "a case on third-party standing").
334. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., 517
U.S. 544, 551-52 (1996) ("The notion that an organization might have standing to
assert its members' injury has roots in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.").
335. Patterson,357 U.S. at 452.
336. Id. at 453.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

124

[Vol. 86.73

produce its membership lists, leading the state court to hold it in civil
contempt and fine it $100,000 for violating the production order.3 3 7
The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and, on the merits, held that
the production order violated the First Amendment rights of the
NAACP's members. 338 Before reaching the merits, the Court held that
the NAACP had "standing" to assert its members' rights. 339 The Court
observed that it "ha[d] generally insisted that parties rely only on
constitutional rights which are personal to themselves." 340 It added,
however, that its rule against third-party standing "is not
disrespected where constitutional rights of persons who are not
immediately before the Court could not be effectively vindicated
except through an appropriate representative before the Court." 34 1
The Court found that to be true in the case before it:
If
petitioner's
rank-and-file
members
are
constitutionally entitled to withhold their connection
with the Association despite the production order, it is
manifest that this right is properly assertable by the
Association. To require that it be claimed by the
members themselves would result in nullification of the
right at the very moment of its assertion. 342
Besides the members' inability to assert their own rights
effectively, the Court determined that the NAACP could effectively
represent its members' rights "because it and its members are in every
practical sense identical."34 3 The NAACP was "but the medium
through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their own views." 344 Finally, the Court relied on the
connection between (1) the injury to its members' rights posed by the
challenged order to produce its membership list and (2) the potential
organizational injury to the NAACP itself: "The reasonable likelihood
that the Association itself through diminished financial support and
membership may be adversely affected if production is compelled is a
further factor pointing towards our holding that petitioner has
standing to complain of the production order on behalf of its

337.
338.
339.

Id. at 453-54.
Id. at 460-66.
Id. at 459.

340.
341.

Id.
Id.

342.
343.
344.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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members." 345 Thus, the NAACP in Pattersonmet the requirements for
third-party standing: It could show injury in fact, stemming from the
contempt sanction imposed by the state court.3 46 In addition, it could
show a close relationship with its members and a hindrance that kept
members from asserting their own rights.3 47
The Court relied on its decision in Patterson to uphold the
NAACP's standing to assert its members' rights in NAACP v.
Button.348 In Button, the NAACP again confronted a state law that
the State had interpreted to require the NAACP to cease operations
in the State: The Virginia courts had held that the NAACP's activities
violated state law barring the "improper solicitation of legal
business." 34 9 In its suit challenging the Virginia law, the NAACP
asserted injury to the constitutional rights of itself and its
members.3 5 0 The Court first held that the NAACP sufficiently alleged
injury to itself.35 1 Next, the Court held, relying on Patterson,that the

NAACP also "ha[d] standing to assert the corresponding rights of its
members." 352 Button fits the Court's description of third-party
standing cases as including ones in which the Court "allow[s] standing
to litigate the rights of third parties when enforcement of the
challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in
the violation of third parties' rights." 3 53
In sum, the modern doctrine of associational standing applied in
Hunt354 rests almost entirely on the Court's one-paragraph per curiam
opinion in National Motor Freight Traffic Association355 and
Patterson,3 56 a case involving third-party standing. This precedent
provides weak support at best.

345. Id. at 459-60.
346. Id.
347. E.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004).
348. 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).
349. Id. at 425-26.
350. Id. at 428.
351. Id. ("We think petitioner may assert this right [to associate] on its own
behalf, because ... it is directly engaged in those activities ... which the statute would
curtail.").
352. Id.
353. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin 422
U.S. 490, 510 (1975)).
354. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
355. 372 U.S. 246 (1963).
356. 357 U.S. 449, 452 (1958).
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C. There Is a Better Alternative to the Hunt Test for Associational
Standing.
As explained above, the Hunt test is anomalous and
unprecedented, and it does not ensure that the plaintiff-organization
will adequately represent the members or other constituents whose
rights it seeks to assert. 357 But as this section explains, under some
circumstances, including those presented in Hunt itself, an
association can adequately represent its constituents, and should be
allowed to do so when the constituents themselves would have
standing to sue in their own right. The plaintiff-organization,
however, should bear the burden of proving it will adequately
represent its constituents as part of its overall burden of establishing
standing.3 5 8 This Article proposes that the plaintiff-organization can
establish a rebuttable presumption of adequacy by showing it meets
the criteria that the Court actually relied on in upholding
associational standing in Hunt.
To recap Hunt, the Court relied on three circumstances to
conclude that the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission
had associational standing. 359 First, the Commission existed to
promote the shared interests of a discrete segment of the population,
including through suits like the one before the Court.3 60 Second, the
constituents whose interests it sought to assert alone elected the
Commission's leadership, could serve as leaders, and financed all of
the Commission's activities, including the suit before the Court.36 1
Finally, the outcome of the litigation would adversely affect the
constituents in a concrete way that could also adversely affect the
Commission itself.3 6 2

When those circumstances exist, they presumptively establish the
identity of interests on which, as Justice Powell argued, associational
standing should rest.3 63 Even then, it should be open to the defendant

to show that the plaintiff-organization is unlikely to represent its
constituents adequately. For example, the defendant might show that
the lawsuit is driven primarily by a minority of particularly powerful
constituents or by interests wholly unrelated to those of its

357.
See supra notes 287-356 and accompanying text (discussing the Hunt test).
358.
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (holding that
plaintiff bears burden of proving standing).

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1977).
Id. at 344.
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 345.
UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 297 & n.* (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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constituents. 364 Even if the suit has the support of a majority of the
constituents, an internal conflict of interests may make the plaintifforganization an unsuitable representative.3 6 5 If the defendant shows
that the plaintiff-organization might not be an adequate
representative, the court must make a case-specific determination of
adequacy, just as it would for named plaintiffs in a putative class
action. 366
This proposal-i.e., to use the circumstances actually relied upon
in Hunt to create a rebuttable presumption of adequacy-has three
virtues besides reliably ensuring an identity of interests between an
organization and its constituents. First, it respects the actual holding
in Hunt, while ignoring the lax, unprecedented three-part test that
the Court formulated there.36 7 Second, it accords with the Court's per
curiam opinion upholding the standing of trade associations in
National Motor Freight Traffic Association.36 8 Third, it accounts for
cases in which the Court has let an organization assert its
constituents' rights with little or no attention to the organization's
standing. 369

364. Id. (noting that the necessary identity of interests between the plaintifforganization and its constituents could be lacking if only a few members care about
the lawsuit); see also Local 186, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouseman
& Helpers of Am. v. Brock, 812 F.2d 1235, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 1987) (denying
associational standing to local union that challenged federal law terminating its
secretary-treasurer because of his felony conviction); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
10, § 3531.9.5, at 908 (describing Teamsters v. Brock as apparently resting on
"potential conflict between the interests of an organization's leadership and members'
interests').
See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1980) (church group lacked
365.
standing to sue for members who would choose to have abortions "as a matter of
religious practice" because members held conflicting views on abortion); Retired
Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856, 865 (1996) (stating that internal
conflict "raises a concern that the association will not be fully committed to the
litigation").
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (stating that class action can be maintained only
366.
if "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class").
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)
367.
(articulating the three-part test).
372 U.S. 246, 247 (1963), discussed supra notes 317-29 and accompanying
368.
text.
E.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1230 (2015) (suit
369.
by trade association asserting rights of members; no discussion of standing); Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 569 U.S. 641, 646-48 (2013) (same); Ne.
Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 66366 (1993) (discussing standing of trade association's members without discussing trade
association's standing to assert them); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 40
n.8 (1981) (devoting one sentence to discussing, and upholding, standing of

128

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86.73

D. There Is Authority for Associational Standing.
The last section argued that the Court should jettison the Hunt
test for associational standing in favor of one based on the actual
holding in Hunt. If the Court continues to recognize associational
standing, the Court should address its authority to do so. The issue of
authority arises because associational standing is an exception to the
rule against a plaintiffs asserting the rights of others. 370 The Court
used to classify that rule as a judicially created "prudential" rule of
standing. 37 1 The Court cast doubt on that classification, however, in
Lexmark International,Inc. v. Static ControlComponents, Inc.3 72 So if

the rule against asserting the rights of others is not a prudential one
that courts have developed, what is the source of this rule, and of its
exceptions? This section briefly and tentatively answers that
question.
The answer begins by observing that some associational standing
cases are really third-party standing cases. They are the ones in which
the plaintiff-organization and its constituents have both suffered an
injury that harms or blocks the relationship between them. The
paradigm example is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, in which
the NAACP challenged a state court order that required it to disclose
its membership lists and under which the NAACP was fined for noncompliance. 373
Henry Monaghan has argued that many third-party standing
cases should be understood as ones in which litigants actually assert

organization representing the elderly to assert members' rights); Bos. Stock Exch. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977) (upholding standing of stock
exchanges to assert their members' rights; short discussion of exchanges' standing in
note); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 406 (1971) (including
as plaintiff an organization of users of Overton Park); Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. United
States, 364 U.S. 1, 5, 17-18 (1960) (suit included trade associations as plaintiffs; Court
addressed standing of members without addressing standing of associations); Ass'n of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 838 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397
U.S. 150 (1970) (suit including trade association as one plaintiff).
370. E.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp.,
517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996).
371. Id.
372. 572 U.S. 118, 127 & n.3 (2014) (holding that, although Court had previously
said "zone-of-interests test" reflected rule of "prudential standing," the test instead
requires a determination of "whether a legislatively conferred cause of action
encompasses a particular plaintiffs claim," and noting that, although it had
"suggest[ed]" that doctrine of third-party standing is likewise prudential, third-party
standing's "proper place in the standing firmament can await another day").
373.
357 U.S. 449, 453 (1958), discussed supra notes 334-47 and accompanying
text.
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their own rights. 374 Specifically, they are "asserting a substantive due
process right to interact with a third party right holder free from
unjustifiable governmental interference." 375 Professor Monaghan
cited Patterson as an example. 376 Even if Professor Monaghan's
proposed constitutional "right to interact" does not account for all
cases upholding third-party standing, it does reorient the inquiry
away from the oddly discretionary nature of third-party standing377
with which the Court in Lexmark was so concerned -to the more
objective, defensible question of whether the plaintiff has a viable
cause of action, a reorientation that scholars such as Heather Elliot,
378
William Fletcher, and James Pfander have endorsed.
As Professor Monaghan noted, this "first party" explanation for
379
He
many third-party standing cases does not account for all cases.
described the remaining cases as ones that allow the litigant to serve
380
Professor
as "a judicially licensed private attorney general."
attorneys
private
license
can
courts
Monaghan doubted that federal
general to assert third-party rights.3 81 More important for our
purposes, he thought it necessary to assume that if judicial authority
did exist, "any private attorney general licensed by the Court will have
382
Thus, his approach does not
suffered cognizable injury in fact."
account for cases like Hunt and National Motor Freight Traffic

374. Monaghan, supra note 224, at 299.
375. Id. at 282.
376. Id. at 288, 314.
377. Lexmark Int7, Inc., 572 U.S. at 125-26 (stating that "prudential" grounds for
declining jurisdiction are "in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the
principle that a federal court's obligation to hear and decide cases within its
jurisdiction is virtually unflagging") (internal quotation marks omitted).
378. See Heather Elliott, The Structure of Standing at 25, 65 ALA. L. REV. 269,
270-71 (2013) (supporting Fletcher's idea that the question of standing should be
treated as a question on the merits); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing,
98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) (proposing the idea that "standing should simply be a
question on the merits of a plaintiffs claim"); James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable
Interests, andArticle IL's Case-or-ControversyRequirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 212
(2018) (proposing that the "focus" should be "on whether the plaintiff has a 'litigable
interest"'). But cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Fortuity and the Article III "Case"` A Critique
of Fletcher'sThe Structure of Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 293 (2013) (arguing that
"standing should hinge on whether the plaintiff is presenting a true Article III 'Case,'
which requires a showing that her federal legal rights have been invaded fortuitously
(i.e., involuntarily as a result of a chance occurrence)").
379. Monaghan, supra, note 224, at 310-11.
380. Id. at 282.
381. Id. at 314 (stating that "recognition of jus tertii standing" could be a
"constitutional imperative" in some cases but was "far more problematic" outside of
"that limited framework").
382. Id. at 315 n.203.
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Association, in which a plaintiff-organization is allowed to sue for its
members or other constituents "[elven in the absence of injury to
itself'-or at least in the absence of a judicial determination that the
plaintiff-organization has suffered injury to itself.383
In some of these unaccounted-for cases, a statute may expressly
or impliedly authorize an organization to sue in a purely
representative capacity. Recall that in NationalMotor Freight Traffic
Association, the plaintiff trade associations were created under a
federal statute and were allowed by the ICC to participate in
administrative proceedings on behalf of their members. 384 One could
argue that their authority to sue for their members was implicitly
granted by the statute under which they were created. 385
The Court has held that Congress can expressly authorize
organizations to sue for their members. The Court so held in United
Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group.386
There, the Court upheld as constitutional a federal statute that let
unions sue for the employees they represented.3 8 7 The Court rejected
the argument that the union could not sue because the statute did not
give the union any rights.3 8 8 Thus, the Court's decision reflects that
Congress can expressly authorize organizations to sue in a purely
representative capacity.
The Court's current case law, however, constrains interpreting
federal statutes implicitly to authorize associational standing. In
Warth v. Seldin, the Court said that a federal statute can override the
prudential rule against third-party standing only "expressly or by
clear implication."3 89 In a later case the Court seemed to take an even
more restrictive approach, suggesting that a prudential rule of
standing-like the rule against third-party standing-"applies unless
it is expressly negated" by a statute. 390 The Court may, however,
modify its "clear statement" rule if it revisits the "prudential" nature
of the rule against third-party standing. 9 1

383.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
384.
See supra notes 317-29 and accompanying text (discussing National Motor
Freight Traffic Association v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963) (per curiam)).
385.
Cf. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (stating that, in cases letting plaintiffs assert the
legal rights of third parties, "the Court has found, in effect, that the constitutional or
statutory provision in question implies a right of action in the plaintiff').
386.
517 U.S. 544, 546 (1996).
387. Id. at 551-58.
388. Id. at 549-50.
389.
Warth, 422 U.S. at 509-10.
390.
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997).
391.
See supra notes 370-71 and accompanying text (discussing the "prudential"
rule of standing).
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Just as a federal statute can authorize an organization to sue in a
representative capacity, so can a state statute. Indeed, this may
392
Recall that the plaintiff in
explain the Court's decision in Hunt.
Hunt, the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, was
created by state statute. 393 The Commission had "the statutory duty
394
Its
of promoting and protecting the State's apple industry."
39 5
statutory powers included the power to sue and be sued.
Collectively, the state statutes governing the Commission could
reasonably be interpreted to authorize the Commission's suit in Hunt,
39 6
given that the suit advanced the Commission's statutory duty.
But if you accept that interpretation of Hunt, the question
becomes whether a federal court can give effect to a state statute
authorizing an entity to sue in a representative capacity. The answer
appears to be "sometimes." At least indirect support for that answer
is provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), which generally
has federal courts consult state law to determine a party's capacity to
sue or be sued.39 7 Additional, admittedly indirect support is supplied
by Hollingsworth v. Perry.3 98 In that case, the Court suggested that
state law could appoint a private person to serve as an agent to defend
the constitutionality of a state law in a federal court, as long as the
law established a true principal-agent relationship, with its
concomitant fiduciary duties. 3 9 9 Perhaps the need for a true principalagent relationship is meant to ensure that the plaintiff-agent
adequately represents, and is controlled by, the principal. If so, it is
consistent with Article III's demand for a plaintiff with a "concrete
stake" in the outcome 400 and the Due Process Clause's demand that
the plaintiff faithfully and zealously represents the interests of the
1
party who is not before the court. 40 Put another way, the principal-

432 U.S. 333, 335, 382 (1977).
392.
See supra notes 237-64 (summarizing the Hunt case) and accompanying
393.
text; see also Hunt, 432 U.S. at 33G-37 (explaining the Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission's statutory duty).
394. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 336-37.
395. Id. at 339 n.3.
396. Id. at 344.
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b).
397.
570 U.S. 693, 712-14 (2013); cf. Wisconsin ex rel. Bolens v. Frear, 231 U.S.
398.
(1914) (private relator asserting public rights in challenging a state law
620-21
616,
as unconstitutional could not seek U.S. Supreme Court review of state supreme court's
decision without state's consent because relator was a "mere agent" of the state).
399. Perry, 570 U.S. at 712-14.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
400.
191 (2000).
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
401.
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agent relationship ensures the identity of interests that Justice
Powell believed should underlie associational standing. 402
Besides federal and state statutes, the "federal common law of
procedure" might justify associational standing in some cases. 403 In
an early case applying the rule against asserting third parties' rights,
the Court said there were exceptions to the rule "where, by statute or
the settled practice of the courts, the plaintiff is permitted to sue for
the benefit of another." 404 Similarly, in a modern case discussing the
general rule against asserting third parties' rights, the Court said,
[T]he entire doctrine of 'representational standing,' of
which the notion of 'associational standing' is only one
strand, rests on the premise that in certain
circumstances, particular relationships (recognized
either by common-law tradition or by statute) are
sufficient to rebut the background presumption ...
that litigants may not assert the rights of absent third
parties. 405
Perhaps the common-law tradition could support associational
standing in some cases.
In short, several sources of authority may support associational
standing. They include a constitutional protection for the relationship
between an organization and its constituents; federal and state
statutes expressly or impliedly authorizing organizations to sue for
constituents; and the federal common law of procedure. The Court's
decision in Lexmark suggests it might clarify the source of authority
for associational standing when it revisits the rule against asserting
the rights of others. 406

402.
UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 297 & n.* (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
403.
19 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4505, at 67 n.67 (3d ed. 2008) (using "federal common law of procedure" to mean
"judge-made rules of practice and procedure," and giving as an example remittitur
practice).
404.
Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406 (1900) (emphasis
added).
405.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., 517
U.S. 544, 557 (1996) (emphasis added); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separationof Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
881, 886 (1983) (stating that courts apply prudential standing rules "as a set of
presumptions derived from common-law traditiondesigned to determine whether a
legal right exists") (emphasis added).
406.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127-28
n.3 (2014).

2018]

PATAGONIA VS. TRUMP

133

CONCLUSION

Patagonia lived up to its image as an innovative, activist company
when it sued President Trump in federal court for reducing the Bears
Ears National Monument. Also, consistently with that image,
Patagonia will make bold arguments for its standing to bring the suit.
Although this Article concludes that Patagonia's standing arguments
should not succeed, Patagonia's suit provides a vehicle for
reexamining some of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions on which
Patagonia's standing arguments depend. This Article has argued that
the Court should clarify that one of its decisions on organizational
standing, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, does not apply to suits to
vindicate public rights, like Patagonia's suit. The Article has also
argued that the Court should revisit and repudiate the test for
associational standing that it established in Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission and on which Patagonia will rely.

